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The Taxing Challenges of the State: Unveiling the Role of Fiscal & Administrative Capacity in Development

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  • Esteban Muñoz-Sobrado
  • Amedeo Piolatto
  • Antoine Zerbini
  • Federica Braccioli

Abstract

During the past two decades, several factors have challenged the stability of national states, adding tensions to the connection between the state and the individual. This paper reviews the literature on state capacity. First, it introduces the origin of the literature and presents the well-established positive correlation between state capacity and economic development. Second, it touches upon fiscal and administrative capacity and conflict. It concludes with a provocative reflection on digital nomads to push the research frontier in analysing the connection between the state and the individual.

Suggested Citation

  • Esteban Muñoz-Sobrado & Amedeo Piolatto & Antoine Zerbini & Federica Braccioli, 2024. "The Taxing Challenges of the State: Unveiling the Role of Fiscal & Administrative Capacity in Development," Working Papers 1432, Barcelona School of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:bge:wpaper:1432
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    aministrative capacity; fiscal capacity; state capacity; conflict;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • H20 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - General
    • E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy; Modern Monetary Theory
    • H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • H83 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - Public Administration
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions

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