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The Condorcet Jury-Theorem with Two Independent Error-Probabilities Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Roland Kirstein (University of Saarland)
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The Condorcet jury-theorem is derived from the implicit assumption that jury members may only commit one type of error. In binary decision situations however, two error types may occur, the probability of which is independent of each other. Taking this into account leads to a generalization of the theorem.
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Paper provided by Berkeley Electronic Press in its series German Working Papers in Law and Economics with number
2006-1-1154.
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Handle: RePEc:bep:dewple:2006-1-1154Note: oai:bepress:Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.bepress.com/gwp/default/
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Keywords: Group decisions ; judicial ; imperfect decision-making ; Find related papers by JEL classification: D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations K40 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - General L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
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