The provision of quality in a bilateral search market
AbstractWe accomplish two goals. First, we provide a non-cooperative foundation for the use of the Nash bargaining solution in search markets. This finding should help to close the rift between the search and the matching-and-bargaining literature. Second, we establish that the diversity of quality offered (at an increasing price-quality ratio) in a decentralized market is an equilibrium phenomenon - even in the limit as search frictions disappear.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC) in its series UFAE and IAE Working Papers with number 534.02.
Date of creation: 02 Aug 2002
Date of revision:
quality dispersion; Nash Program; bilateral search;
Other versions of this item:
- Clara Ponsati & Jozsef Sakovics, 2004. "The provision of quality in a bilateral search market," ESE Discussion Papers 86, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- L11 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
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- Sakovics, J. & Ponsati, C., 1995. "Rubinstein Batgaining with Tow-Sided Options," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 318.95, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
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