Federal Fiscal Constitutions ; Part I: Risk Sharing and Moral Hazard

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Federal Fiscal Constitutions ; Part I: Risk Sharing and Moral Hazard

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Persson, T.
Tabellini, G.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC) in its series UFAE and IAE Working Papers with number 222.93.

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Length: 37 pages
Date of creation: 1993
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:aub:autbar:222.93

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Related research
Keywords: tax policy ; risk;

Other versions of this item:

Paper
- Torsten Persson & Guido Tabellini, 1992. "Federal fiscal constitutions part 1: risk sharing and moral hazard," Discussion Paper / Institute for Empirical Macroeconomics 72, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. [Downloadable!]
- Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 1992. "Federal Fiscal Constitutions. Part I: Risk Sharing and Moral Hazard," CEPR Discussion Papers 728, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
- Persson, T. & Tabellini, G., 1992. "Federal Fiscal Constitutions ; Part I: Risk Sharing and Moral Hazard," Papers 519, Stockholm - International Economic Studies.
- Torsten Persson & Guido Tabellini, . "Federal Fiscal Constitutions. Part I: Risk Sharing and Moral Hazard," EPRU Working Paper Series 93-04, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU), University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

Grandmont, Jean-Michel, 1978. "Intermediate Preferences and the Majority Rule," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 46(2), pages 317-30, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Bureau, Dominique & Champsaur, Paul, 1992. "Fiscal Federalism and European Economic Unification," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(2), pages 88-92, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Rogoff, Kenneth, 1985. "The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 100(4), pages 1169-89, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Tabellini, Guido & Alesina, Alberto, 1990. "Voting on the Budget Deficit," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(1), pages 37-49, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Alberto Alesina & Guido Tabellini, 1988. "Voting on the Budget Deficit," NBER Working Papers 2759, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
- Alesina, Alberto F & Tabellini, Guido, 1988. "Voting on the Budget Deficit," CEPR Discussion Papers 269, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
- Guido Tabellini & Alberto Alesina, 1988. "Voting on the Budget Deficit," UCLA Economics Working Papers 539, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Sachs, Jeffrey & Sala-i-Martin, Xavier, 1992. "Fiscal Federalism and Optimum Currency Areas: Evidence for Europe from the United States," CEPR Discussion Papers 632, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Xavier Sala-i-Martin & Jeffrey Sachs, 1991. "Fiscal Federalism and Optimum Currency Areas: Evidence for Europe From the United States," NBER Working Papers 3855, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Wildasin, David E, 1990. "Budgetary Pressures in the EEC: A Fiscal Federalism Perspective," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(2), pages 69-74, May.
Jewitt, Ian, 1988. "Justifying the First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(5), pages 1177-90, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

Lejour, A., 1995. "Cooperative and Competitive Policies in the EU : The European Siamese Twin ?," Discussion Paper 20, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
Fausto Hernández Trillo & Alberto Díaz Cayeros & Rafael Gamboa González, 2002. "Fiscal Decentralization in Mexico: The Bailout Problem," RES Working Papers 3143, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department. [Downloadable!]

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