Budgetary Pressures in the EEC: A Fiscal Federalism Perspective
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by American Economic Association in its journal American Economic Review.
Volume (Year): 80 (1990)
Issue (Month): 2 (May)
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- Strain, J. Frank, 1993. "Integration, Federalism and Cohesion in the European Community: Lessons from Canada," Research Series, Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI), number PRS16, December.
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- Augusta Badriotti & Margherita Fornasini & Clément Vaneecloo, 2006. "L’evoluzione della Costituzione in Belgio e in Italia: un’analisi delle relazioni fiscali intergovernative," Rivista di Politica Economica, SIPI Spa, vol. 96(4), pages 229-260, July-Augu.
- Philippe Mills & Hervé Bonnaz, 1993. "Perspectives du budget communautaire en union économique et monétaire," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 109(3), pages 39-46.
- Lejour, A.M., 1995. "Social insurance and the completion of the internal market," Discussion Paper 1995-61, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Schmieding, Holger, 1992. "Maastricht: A dead end of European integration?," Kiel Discussion Papers 192, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW).
- Hein Roelfsema, 2004. "Legislative Bargaining and Lobbying in the European Union," Working Papers 04-16, Utrecht School of Economics.
- Deltas, George & Van Der Beek, Gregor, 2003. "Modeling fiscal federalism: a decomposition analysis of changes in intra-European Union budgetary transfers," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 43(4), pages 592-613.
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