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Perspectives du budget communautaire en union économique et monétaire

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  • Hervé Bonnaz
  • Philippe Mills

Abstract

[ger] Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion: die Perspektiven für den EG-Haushalt, . von Hervé Bonnaz, Philippe Mills.. . Die Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion führt nicht zwangsweise zu einer volumenmäßigen Veränderung des EG-Haushaltes und scheint mit einer dezentralisierten Wahmehmung der kollektiven Aufgaben, wie sie de facto derzeit erfolgt, vereinbar zu sein. Die sich daraus ergebenden Externalitäten ließen sich entweder durch Koordinierung oder durch Harmonisierung lösen. Insbesondae könnten die Umverteilungspolitiken wahrscheinlich auf nationaler Ebene durch die Annahme von Mindestnormen beibehalten werden, zumal sowohl theoretische Argumente, wie beispielsweise die Umvateilung habe den Charakter eines lokalen öffentlichen Gutes, als auch das Vorhandensein wirtschaftlicher und kultureller Hemmnisse, die den freien Personenverkehr behindern, die Vertretbarkeit einer solchen Hypothèse unterstützen. Nichtsdestoweniger wird die WWU einen verstärkten Wettbewerbsdruck zur Folge haben, weshalb sich ihre Mitglieder hinsichtlich der Effizienz ihrer Aktionen zu mehr Wachsamkeit veranlaßt sehen werden. [eng] The Outlook for the Community Budget Under Economic and Monetary Union, . by Hervé Bonnaz and Philippe Mills.. . Economic and Monetary Union need not necessarily lead to a change in the distribution of the Community budget and would seem to be compatible with a decentralization of collective tasks such as that which currently prevails. The resulting externalities could be resolved by co-ordination or harmonization. In particular, national redistributive policies should be able to be maintained in return for the adoption of minimum standards; a hypothesis that would seem to be supported by both the theoretical arguments (redistribution should be classed as a local public good) and the existence of economic and cultural barriers limiting the free movement of pasons. The fact nonetheless remains that EMU will induce inaeased competition, which will encourage its members to be more careful about the effectiveness of their actions. [fre] Perspectives du budget communautaire en union économique et monétaire, . par Hervé Bonnaz, Philippe Mills .. . L'Union économique et monétaire ne doit pas nécessairement conduire à un changement d'échelle du budget de la Communauté, et paraît compatible avec une décentralisation de l'exercice des fonctions collectives, telle que celle qui, de facto, prévaut actuellement. Les externalités qui en résulteraient peuvent être résolues par la coordination ou l'harmonisation. En particulier, les politiques redistributives devraient pouvoir être maintenues au niveau national, moyennant l'adoption de normes minimales, tant des arguments théoriques (la redistribuuon aurait la nature d'un bien public local) que l'existence d'obstacles économiques et culturels qui limitent la circulation des personnes, tendant à prouver la soutenabilité d'une telle hypothèse. Il n'en reste pas moins vrai que l'UEM imposera une concurrence accrue, ce qui incitera ses membres à exercer une plus grande vigilance sur l 'efficacité de leurs actions. [spa] Perspectivas del presupuesto comunitario en una unión éconómica y monetaria, . por Hervé Bonnaz y Philippe Mills.. . La Unión económica y monetaria no debe dar lugar, obligatoriamente, a un cambio de escala del presupuesto de la Comunidad y parece compatible conuna descentralización del ejercicio de las funciones colectivas, tal como de hecho, prevalece actualmente. Las externalidades que de ello podrían derivarse se podrán resolver por la coordinación o la armonización. En particular, las políticas redistributivas deberían poder mantenerse al nivel national, a cambio de la adopción de normas míninas, tanto los argumentos teóncos (la redistribución presentaría el carácter de un bien público local) como la existencia de obstáculos económicos y culturales que limitan la circulación de las personas, tendiente a demostrar la veracidad de semejante hipótesis. No es menos cierto que la UEM habrá de imponer una competencia intensiva, cosa que incitaría a sus miembros a una mayor vigilancia en cuanto a la eficacia de sus acciones.

Suggested Citation

  • Hervé Bonnaz & Philippe Mills, 1993. "Perspectives du budget communautaire en union économique et monétaire," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 109(3), pages 39-46.
  • Handle: RePEc:prs:ecoprv:ecop_0249-4744_1993_num_109_3_5620
    DOI: 10.3406/ecop.1993.5620
    Note: DOI:10.3406/ecop.1993.5620
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