Optimal gate revenue sharing in sports leagues
AbstractSports leagues constitute one of the few examples of legally operating cartels. In this paper I examine how gate revenue sharing may serve to coordinate talent investments within these cartels. I show that sharing revenues has the potential to raise cartel profits, because it decreases the incentive to invest in playing talent. Leagues consisting of teams with heterogeneous local markets should share less revenues to maximize profits, whereas homogeneous teams should share more.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Antwerp, Faculty of Applied Economics in its series Working Papers with number 2011015.
Length: 23 pages
Date of creation: Oct 2011
Date of revision:
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Web page: https://www.uantwerp.be/en/faculties/applied-economic-sciences/
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Cartel behavior; Revenue sharing; Sports leagues;
Other versions of this item:
- L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
- L83 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Sports; Gambling; Restaurants; Recreation; Tourism
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