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Firing Costs And Job Loss: The Case Of The Italian Jobs Act

Author

Listed:
  • Claudia Pigini

    (Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche e Sociali - Universita' Politecnica delle Marche)

  • Stefano Staffolani

    (Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche e Sociali - Universita' Politecnica delle Marche)

Abstract

A recent reform in the Italian labour market has modified the permanent contract by reducing firing costs. Using a discontinuity in the application of the reform, we evaluate its the effect on the probability of being still employed 600 days later. In contrast with theoretical predictions, we find that the job survival probability is not smaller for the treated and even significantly larger in some cases. We investigate the composition of permanent workers hired after the reform, as we find evidence of treated firms hiring workers eligible for a significant reduction of non-wage labour costs.

Suggested Citation

  • Claudia Pigini & Stefano Staffolani, 2019. "Firing Costs And Job Loss: The Case Of The Italian Jobs Act," Working Papers 443, Universita' Politecnica delle Marche (I), Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche e Sociali.
    • Handle: RePEc:anc:wpaper:443
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    Cited by:

    1. Paolo Emilio Mistrulli & Tommaso Oliviero & Zeno Rotondi & Alberto Zazzaro, 2023. "Job Protection and Mortgage Conditions: Evidence from Italian Administrative Data," Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, Department of Economics, University of Oxford, vol. 85(6), pages 1211-1237, December.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Keywords: Deregulation; Employment Protection Legislation; Graded Security; Open-Ended Contracts;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • J23 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Labor Demand
    • J30 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - General
    • J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts

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