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An Experimental Economic Analysis of Carbon Trading Options for Australia

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  • Tisdell, John G.
  • Grainger, Corinne

Abstract

Australia is currently developing a carbon emissions trading program. The Garnaut report recommendations include options for the allocation of carbon credits, trading schemes, banking and borrowing, and self reporting mechanisms. This paper reports the results of a series of economic experiments in which we explored spot and future markets given high and low levels of carbon credit reductions. The results provide important insights to the current debate in Australia and highlight the importance of well crafted market design.

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File URL: http://purl.umn.edu/51044
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by International Association of Agricultural Economists in its series 2009 Conference, August 16-22, 2009, Beijing, China with number 51044.

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Date of creation: 2009
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Handle: RePEc:ags:iaae09:51044

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Keywords: climate change; emissions trading; compliance; Environmental Economics and Policy; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy; Q53; Q54;

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  8. Cason, T.N. & Gangadharan, L., 1997. "An Experimental Study of Electronic Bulletin Board Trading for Emission Permits," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 592, The University of Melbourne.
  9. Cason, Timothy N. & Gangadharan, Lata & Duke, Charlotte, 2003. "Market Power in Tradable Emission Markets: A Laboratory Testbed for Emission Trading in Port Phillip Bay, Victoria," 2003 Conference (47th), February 12-14, 2003, Fremantle, Australia 57841, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society.
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  12. Robert N. Stavins, 1998. "What Can We Learn from the Grand Policy Experiment? Lessons from SO2 Allowance Trading," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 12(3), pages 69-88, Summer.
  13. Jamie Brown-Kruse & Steven R Elliot & Rob Godby, 1995. "Strategic Manipulation of Pollution Permit Markets: An Experimental Approach," Department of Economics Working Papers 1995-03, McMaster University.
  14. Adam Jaffe & Richard Newell & Robert Stavins, 2002. "Environmental Policy and Technological Change," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 22(1), pages 41-70, June.
  15. Goulder, Lawrence H. & Mathai, Koshy, 2000. "Optimal CO2 Abatement in the Presence of Induced Technological Change," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 1-38, January.
  16. Grubler, Arnulf & Messner, Sabine, 1998. "Technological change and the timing of mitigation measures," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(5-6), pages 495-512, December.
  17. Cason, Timothy N. & Gangadharan, Lata, 2006. "Emissions variability in tradable permit markets with imperfect enforcement and banking," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 199-216, October.
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