Our products are safe (don't tell anyone!). Why don't supermarkets advertise their private food safety standards?
AbstractLarge retail chains have spent considerable resources to promote production protocols and traceability across the supply chain, aiming at increasing food safety. Yet, the majority of consumers are unaware of these private food safety standards (PFSS) and retailers are not informing them. This behavior denotes a pooling paradox: supermarkets spend a large amount of money for food safety and yet they forget to inform consumers. The result is a pooling equilibrium where consumers cannot discriminate among high quality and low quality products and supermarkets give up the potential price premium. This paper provides an economic explanation for the paradox using a contract-theory model. We found that PFSS implementation may be rational even if consumers have no willingness to pay for safety, because the standard can be used as a tool to solve asymmetric information along the supply chain. Using the PFSS, supermarkets can achieve a separating equilibrium where opportunistic suppliers have no incentive to accept the contract. Even if consumers exhibit a limited (but strictly positive) willingness to pay for safety, advertising may be profit-reducing. If the expected price margin is high enough, supermarkets have incentive to supply both certified and uncertified products. In this case, we show that, if consumers perceive undifferentiated products as “reasonably safe”, supermarkets may maximize profits by pooling the goods and selling them as undifferentiated. This result is not driven by advertising costs, as we derive it assuming free advertising.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by European Association of Agricultural Economists in its series 2011 International Congress, August 30-September 2, 2011, Zurich, Switzerland with number 115987.
Date of creation: 02 Sep 2011
Date of revision:
Agribusiness; Food Consumption/Nutrition/Food Safety;
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-10-15 (All new papers)
- NEP-CTA-2011-10-15 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-MKT-2011-10-15 (Marketing)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Klaus G. Grunert, 2005. "Food quality and safety: consumer perception and demand," European Review of Agricultural Economics, Foundation for the European Review of Agricultural Economics, vol. 32(3), pages 369-391, September.
- Giraud-Heraud, Eric & Grazia, Cristina & Hammoudi, Abdelhakim, 2007. "Agrifood safety standards, market power and consumer misperceptions," 105th Seminar, March 8-10, 2007, Bologna, Italy 7849, European Association of Agricultural Economists.
- Berdegue, Julio A. & Balsevich, Fernando & Flores, Luis & Reardon, Thomas, 2005. "Central American supermarkets' private standards of quality and safety in procurement of fresh fruits and vegetables," Food Policy, Elsevier, vol. 30(3), pages 254-269, June.
- repec:feb:framed:0065 is not listed on IDEAS
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