Exploring Voting Anomalies Using a Demand Revealing Random Price Voting Mechanism
AbstractRecent papers show that in group decisions individuals have social preferences for efficiency and equity. However, the effect of social preferences on voting, the predominant funding mechanism for public goods, has not been thoroughly examined. This study investigates whether voting decisions are affected by the distribution of net benefits associated with a proposed public program using a new Random Price Voting Mechanism (RPVM). Theoretical and econometric analysis of experimental results presented in the paper suggest that observed differences from selfish voting are caused by a concern for social efficiency, and that voting may be more efficient than previously thought.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Cornell University, Department of Applied Economics and Management in its series Working Papers with number 127062.
Date of creation: 2006
Date of revision:
Demand and Price Analysis; C91; C92; D64; D72; H41;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
- C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
- D64 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Altruism; Philanthropy
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
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