Who Shares Risk with Whom under Different Enforcement Mechanisms?
AbstractWe investigate whether available enforcement mechanisms affect who shares risk with whom in sub-Saharan Africa, by applying dyadic regression analysis to data from a lab-type experiment, surveys, and a genealogical-mapping exercise. During the experiment, participants were invited to form risk-sharing groups under three enforcement mechanisms: external, intrinsic, and extrinsic (i.e., social sanctioning). Same-sex dyads and dyads who belong to the same economic community-based organizations (CBOs) are more likely to share risk. However, when social sanctioning is possible, comembers in economic CBOs withdraw from group formation and coreligion, and marriage ties come to the fore.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by University of Chicago Press in its journal Economic Development and Cultural Change.
Volume (Year): 60 (2012)
Issue (Month): 4 ()
Pages: 677 - 706
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Web page: http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/EDCC/
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- Abigail Barr & Orazio Attanasio, 2009.
"Risk Pooling, Risk Preferences, and Social Networks,"
Economics Series Working Papers
CSAE WPS/2009-20, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
- Orazio Attanasio & Abigail Barr & Juan Camilo Cardenas & Garance Genicot & Costas Meghir, 2012. "Risk Pooling, Risk Preferences, and Social Networks," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 4(2), pages 134-67, April.
- Orazio Attansio & Abigail Barr & Juan Camilo Cardenas & Garance Genicot & Costas Mehgir, 2009. "Risk Pooling, Risk preferences, and Social Networks," CSAE Working Paper Series 2009-20, Centre for the Study of African Economies, University of Oxford.
- Garance Genicot, Orazio Attanasio, Abigail Barr, Juan Camilo Cardenas and Costas Meghir, 2011. "Risk Pooling, Risk Preferences, and Social Networks," Working Papers gueconwpa~11-11-05, Georgetown University, Department of Economics.
- Arun G. Chandrasekhar & Cynthia Kinnan & Horacio Larreguy, 2014. "Social Networks as Contract Enforcement: Evidence from a Lab Experiment in the Field," NBER Working Papers 20259, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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