Pay-as-you-speed An Economic Field Experiment
AbstractWe report a vehicle-fleet experiment with an economic incentive for keeping within speed limits using a speed-alert device. A traffic insurance scheme was simulated for two months with a monthly bonus that was reduced by a non-linear speeding penalty. Participants were randomly assigned into four treatment and two control groups. A third control group consisted of drivers who had the device and were monitored, but did not participate. We found that participating drivers reduced severe speeding during the first month, but in the second, after having received feedback reports with an account of earned payments, only those given a penalty changed their behaviour. © 2011 LSE and the University of Bath
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by London School of Economics and University of Bath in its journal Journal of Transport Economics and Policy (JTEP).
Volume (Year): 45 (2011)
Issue (Month): 3 (September)
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Web page: http://www.bath.ac.uk/e-journals/jtep
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- Hultkrantz, Lars & Nilsson, Jan-Eric & Arvidsson, Sara, 2012. "Voluntary internalization of speeding externalities with vehicle insurance," Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, Elsevier, vol. 46(6), pages 926-937.
- Elvik, Rune & Ramjerdi, Farideh, 2014. "A comparative analysis of the effects of economic policy instruments in promoting environmentally sustainable transport," Transport Policy, Elsevier, vol. 33(C), pages 89-95.
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