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Repeated games with incomplete information and discounting


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  • Peski, Marcin

    (University of Toronto)

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    Abstract. We analyze discounted repeated games with incomplete information, such that the players' payoffs depend only on their own type (known-own payoff case). We describe an algorithm for finding all equilibrium payoffs in games for which there exists an open set of belief-free equilibria of Hörner and Lovo (2009). This includes generic games with one-sided incomplete information and a large and important class of games with multi-sided incomplete information. When players become sufficiently patient, all Bayesian Nash equilibrium payoffs can be approximated by payoffs in sequential equilibria in which information is revealed finitely many times. The set of equilibrium payoffs is typically larger than the set of equilibrium payoffs in repeated games without discounting, and larger than the set of payoffs obtained in belief-free equilibria. The results are illustrated in bargaining and oligopoly examples.

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    Article provided by Econometric Society in its journal Theoretical Economics.

    Volume (Year): (Forthcoming)
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    Handle: RePEc:the:publsh:1390

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    Keywords: Repeated games; incomplete information; reputation;

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    1. Susan Athey & Kyle Bagwell, 2004. "Collusion with persistent cost shocks," Discussion Papers 0405-07, Columbia University, Department of Economics.
    2. HART, Sergiu, . "Nonzerosum two-person repeated games with incomplete information," CORE Discussion Papers RP -636, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
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    Cited by:
    1. Francoise Forges & Antoine Salomon, 2014. "Bayesian repeated games and reputation," Working Papers hal-00803919, HAL.


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