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Efficient bargaining, welfare and strategic export policy

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Author Info
Subhayu Bandyopadhyay, Sudeshna C. Bandyopadhyay

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Abstract

We present an efficient bargaining model and analyse the welfare effects of unionization, where rival exporting governments employ strategic export policy. The domestic firm is unionized and conducts a Nash bargain with its union to determine wage and employment. The union may be wage oriented, wage neutral or employment oriented. The foreign firm is non-unionized. Stability of the reaction function equilibrium in policy space is sufficient for the following results: (i) domestic welfare increases with the degree of wage orientation; (ii) an increase in the union's bargaining power leads to higher (lower) domestic welfare if the union is wage (employment) oriented; (iii) if the domestic social marginal cost of labour is less than or equal to the foreign marginal cost, domestic market share is higher under wage orientation.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Taylor and Francis Journals in its journal Journal of International Trade & Economic Development.

Volume (Year): 10 (2001)
Issue (Month): 2 (June)
Pages: 133-149
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Handle: RePEc:taf:jitecd:v:10:y:2001:i:2:p:133-149

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Related research
Keywords: Unionized Oligopoly Wage Orientation And Employment Orientation Union Bargaining Power Stability In Policy Space

References listed on IDEAS
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  1. Bandyopadhyay, Subhayu, 1997. "Demand elasticities, asymmetry and strategic trade policy," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(1-2), pages 167-177, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Bulow, Jeremy I & Geanakoplos, John D & Klemperer, Paul D, 1985. "Multimarket Oligopoly: Strategic Substitutes and Complements," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(3), pages 488-511, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. MaCurdy, Thomas E & Pencavel, John H, 1986. "Testing between Competing Models of Wage and Employment Determination in Unionized Markets," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(3), pages S3-S39, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Brander, James A. & Spencer, Barbara J., 1985. "Export subsidies and international market share rivalry," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(1-2), pages 83-100, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  5. David de Meza, 1986. "Export Subsidies and High Productivity: Cause or Effect?," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 19(2), pages 347-50, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Gaston, Noel & Trefler, Daniel, 1995. "Union wage sensitivity to trade and protection: Theory and evidence," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(1-2), pages 1-25, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Rosen, Sherwin, 1970. "Unionism and the Occupational Wage Structure in the United States," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 11(2), pages 269-86, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Dixit, Avinash K, 1986. "Comparative Statics for Oligopoly," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 27(1), pages 107-22, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Keen, Michael & Lahiri, Sajal, 1993. "Domestic tax reform and international oligopoly," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 55-74, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Bandyopadhyay, Subhayu & Bandyopadhyay, Sudeshna Champati, 1999. "Unionization and International Market Share Rivalry: A Paradox," Review of International Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 7(1), pages 153-61, February.
  11. Brander, James A. & Spencer, Barbara J., 1988. "Unionized oligopoly and international trade policy," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(3-4), pages 217-234, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Zhao, Laixun, 1998. "The Impact of Foreign Direct Investment on Wages and Employment," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 50(2), pages 284-301, April.
  13. Paz Espinosa, Maria & Rhee, Changyong, 1989. "Efficient Wage Bargaining as a Repeated Game," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 104(3), pages 565-88, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Neary, J. Peter, 1994. "Cost asymmetries in international subsidy games: Should governments help winners or losers?," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(3-4), pages 197-218, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  15. Dertouzos, James N & Pencavel, John H, 1981. "Wage and Employment Determination under Trade Unionism: The International Typographical Union," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(6), pages 1162-81, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. Dixit, Avinash K, 1987. "Strategic Behavior in Contests," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(5), pages 891-98, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  17. Mezzetti, Claudio & Dinopoulos, Elias, 1991. "Domestic unionization and import competition," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(1-2), pages 79-100, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  18. Santoni, Michele, 1996. "Union-Oligopoly Sequential Bargaining: Trade and Industrial Policies," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 48(4), pages 640-63, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  19. K. C. Fung, 1995. "Rent Shifting and Rent Sharing: A Re-examination of the Strategic Industrial Policy Problem," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 28(2), pages 450-62, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  20. Pencavel, John H, 1984. "The Tradeoff between Wages and Employment in Trade Union Objectives," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 99(2), pages 215-31, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  21. Tanaka, Yasuhito, 1994. "Profit-sharing and welfare in an export subsidy game," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 45(3), pages 349-353. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  22. Zhao, Laixun, 1995. "Cross-hauling direct foreign investment and unionized oligopoly," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 39(6), pages 1237-1253, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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