Potential Pareto-improving Move towards Most Favored Nation Tariffs
AbstractWe use a multi-country asymmetric oligopolistic framework for segmented markets to study the welfare effects of reducing tariff discriminations - which we call a move towards Most Favored Nation tariffs. Both unilateral and multilateral reforms are considered. We investigate this issue under different scenarios such as when initial tariffs are arbitrary and when they are optimal. Conditions under which such harmonizations are potentially Paretoimproving are derived. We also analyze the effects on individual countries.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Centro Studi Luca d\'Agliano, University of Milano in its series Development Working Papers with number 348.
Date of creation: 24 Apr 2013
Date of revision: 24 Apr 2013
Tari reform; MFN; Welfare; Asymmetric Oligopoly;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- F10 - International Economics - - Trade - - - General
- F11 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Neoclassical Models of Trade
- F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2013-05-05 (All new papers)
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