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Tax Principles and Tax Harmonization under Imperfect Competition: A Cautionary Example

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Author Info
Michael Keen ()
Sajal Lahiri ()
Pascalis Raimondos-Moller ()

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Abstract

This paper shows that under imperfect competition the welfare effects of indirect tax harmonization may depend crucially on whether taxes are levied by the destination or the origin principle. In a standard model of imperfect competition, while harmonization always makes at least one country better off, and may be Pareto-improving, when taxes are levied under the destination principle (which currently applies in the European Union), harmonization of origin-based taxes (as recently proposed by the European Commission) is certain to be Pareto-worsening when the preferences in the two countries are identical, and is likely to be so even when they differ.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by CESifo Group Munich in its series CESifo Working Paper Series with number CESifo Working Paper No. 518.

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Date of creation: 2001
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Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_518

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Related research
Keywords: Harmonization; destination principle; origin principle; commodity taxation;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
H10 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - General

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Andreas Haufler & Guttorm Schjelderup & Frank Staehler, 2000. "Commodity Taxation and international Trade in Imperfect Markets," CoFE Discussion Paper 00-32, Center of Finance and Econometrics, University of Konstanz. [Downloadable!]
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  2. Keen, Michael & Lahiri, Sajal, 1993. "Domestic tax reform and international oligopoly," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 55-74, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Lopez-Garcia, Miguel-Angel, 1998. "On welfare and revenue effects of indirect tax harmonization," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 185-193, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Keen, Michael, 1989. "Pareto-improving indirect tax harmonisation," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 1-12, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Keen, Michael, 1987. "Welfare effects of commodity tax harmonisation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 107-114, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Jones, Ronald W, 1985. "Income Effects and Paradoxes in the Theory of International Trade," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 95(378), pages 330-44, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Keen, Michael & Lahiri, Sajal, 1998. "The comparison between destination and origin principles under imperfect competition," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 323-350, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  1. MORICONI, Simone & SATO, Yasuhiro, 2006. "International commodity taxation in the presence of unemployment," CORE Discussion Papers 2006069, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Ourania Karakosta & Christos Kotsogiannis & Miguel-Angel Lopez-Garcia, 2009. "Does Indirect Tax Harmonization Deliver Pareto Improvements in the Presence of Global Public Goods?," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
  3. Christos Kotsogiannis & Miguel-Angel Lopez-Garcia, 2007. "Imperfect competition, indirect tax harmonization and public goods," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 14(2), pages 135-149, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Haufler, Andreas & Schulte, Christian, 2007. "Merger Policy and Tax Competition," Discussion Papers in Economics 2074, University of Munich, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  5. Kristian, BEHRENS & Johnathan H. HAMILTON & Gianmarco I.P., OTTAVIANO, 2007. "Commodity tax competition and industry location under the destination - and the origin - principle," Discussion Papers (ECON - Département des Sciences Economiques) 2007020, Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Miguel Angel López-García, 2004. "Welfare, Revenue and Indirect Tax Harmonization under the Origin Principle," Hacienda Pública Española, IEF, vol. 168(1), pages 9-25, marzo. [Downloadable!]
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