Political-Economy Arguments for a Uniform Tariff
AbstractUniform tariffs have become increasingly popular in recent years, yet their economic rationale is not strong. We identify and evaluate three sets of reasons as to why governments may prefer tariff uniformity as a means of alleviating political motives for excessive protection. First, a free-rider effect may be conducive to less lobbying under a uniform tariff regime than under a regime in which tariffs are allowed to differ. Second, an input-price effect may dampen the enthusiasm of final-goods producers for import protection. Third, a precommitment effect may increase the cost to a future government of protecting favored sectors. None of these arguments provides an unambiguous, airtight case for tariff uniformity. The decision on uniformity has to be made on a case-by-case basis.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 3661.
Date of creation: Mar 1991
Date of revision:
Publication status: published as International Economic Review, August 1993
Note: ITI IFM
Contact details of provider:
Postal: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.
Web page: http://www.nber.org
More information through EDIRC
Other versions of this item:
- Panagariya, Arvind & Rodrik, Dani, 1993. "Political-Economy Arguments for a Uniform Tariff," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 34(3), pages 685-703, August.
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Balassa, Bela, 1989. "Tariff policy and taxation in developing countries," Policy Research Working Paper Series 281, The World Bank.
- Rodrik, Dani, 1986. "Tariffs, subsidies, and welfare with endogenous policy," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 21(3-4), pages 285-299, November.
- W. M. Corden, 1958. "Import Restrictions And Triffs:A New Look At Australian Policy," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 34(69), pages 331-346, December.
- Panagariya, Arvind, 1992. "Input tariffs, duty drawbacks, and tariff reforms," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 32(1-2), pages 131-147, February.
- Bhagwati, Jagdish N, 1982. "Directly Unproductive, Profit-seeking (DUP) Activities," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 90(5), pages 988-1002, October.
- Mayer, Wolfgang, 1984. "Endogenous Tariff Formation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 74(5), pages 970-85, December.
- Panagariya, Arvind, 1990. "How should tariffs be structured?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 353, The World Bank.
This item has more than 25 citations. To prevent cluttering this page, these citations are listed on a separate page. reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.Access and download statisticsgeneral information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ().
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.