This paper analyzes the effects of corporatism on wage, employment, and optimal trade policy in the context of international market share rivalry. A striking result of the paper is that when an optimal (Nash) subsidy is in place, wages, employment and the level of the optimal export subsidy itself become independent of the degree of corporatism. This result breaks down under free trade or when domestic policy makers endogenize the foreign wage, yielding the familiar negative relationship between the degree of corporatism and wages. [F13, J51]
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Volume (Year): 12 (1998) Issue (Month): 4 (December) Pages: 1-22 Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML
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