This paper analyses the scope for collusive behaviour within the context of an international duopoly supergame in which both firms and monopoly labour unions interact strategically.
Download Info
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page
whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be
available.
Length: 22 pages Date of creation: 1999 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:fth:bereco:1399
Contact details of provider: Postal: Department of Economics, University of Bergen Fosswinckels Gate 6. N-5007 Bergen, Norway Phone: (+47)55589200 Fax: (+47)55589210 Email: Web page: http://www.uib.no/econ/ More information through EDIRC
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Thomas Krichel).
Find related papers by JEL classification: F12 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Models of Trade with Imperfect Competition and Scale Economies J51 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Trade Unions: Objectives, Structure, and Effects L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Cited by: (explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)