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Union Collusion and Intra-Industry Trade

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Author Info
Straume, O.R.

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Abstract

This paper analyses the scope for collusive behaviour within the context of an international duopoly supergame in which both firms and monopoly labour unions interact strategically.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Department of Economics, University of Bergen in its series Norway; Department of Economics, University of Bergen with number 1399.

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Length: 22 pages
Date of creation: 1999
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fth:bereco:1399

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Postal: Department of Economics, University of Bergen Fosswinckels Gate 6. N-5007 Bergen, Norway
Phone: (+47)55589200
Fax: (+47)55589210
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Web page: http://www.uib.no/econ/
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Related research
Keywords: TRADE ; WORKERS' REPRESENTATION ; COLLUSION;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
F12 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Models of Trade with Imperfect Competition and Scale Economies
J51 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Trade Unions: Objectives, Structure, and Effects
L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets

Cited by:
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  1. Lommerud, Kjell Erik & Meland, Frode & Sorgard, Lars, 2002. "Unionized Oligopoly, Trade Liberalization and Location Choice," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Lommerud, Kjell Erik & Sørgard, Lars & Straume, Odd Rune, 2003. "National versus International Mergers in Unionised Oligopoly," CEPR Discussion Papers 4040, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Lommerud, Kjell Erik & Straume , Odd Rune & Sorgard, Lars, 2002. "Downstream Merger with Oligopolistic Input Suppliers," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
  4. Domenico Buccella, . "International Production and Welfare Distribution Under Different Union Wage Settings," FIW Working Paper series 025, FIW. [Downloadable!]
  5. Lommerud, Kjell Erik & Meland, Frode & Straume, Odd Rune, 2005. "Globalization and Union Opposition to Technological Change," CEPR Discussion Papers 4836, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
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This page was last updated on 2009-11-20.


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