Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

Unionisation Triggers Tax Incentives to Attract Foreign Direct Investment

Contents:

Author Info

  • Andreas Haufler
  • Ferdinand Mittermaier

Abstract

This article analyses tax competition between a unionised and a non-unionised country for the location of an outside firm. We show that unionisation increases the incentive for the government to attract a foreign investor, in order to affect the behaviour of the domestic union. This results in the unionised country’s government offering a tax discount (or a subsidy premium) to the outside firm in excess of what is needed to compensate the investor for the higher union wage. In equilibrium, therefore, the unionised country attracts the foreign investment, even if it has no other location advantages.

(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Download Info

To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Royal Economic Society in its journal The Economic Journal.

Volume (Year): 121 (2011)
Issue (Month): 553 (06)
Pages: 793-818

as in new window
Handle: RePEc:ecj:econjl:v:121:y:2011:i:553:p:793-818

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Office of the Secretary-General, School of Economics and Finance, University of St. Andrews, St. Andrews, Fife, KY16 9AL, UK
Phone: +44 1334 462479
Email:
Web page: http://www.res.org.uk/
More information through EDIRC

Order Information:
Web: http://www.blackwellpublishers.co.uk/asp/journal.asp?ref=0013-0133

Related research

Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Ottaviano, Gianmarco I.P. & van Ypersele, Tanguy, 2005. "Market size and tax competition," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 67(1), pages 25-46, September.
  2. Brander, James A. & Spencer, Barbara J., 1988. "Unionized oligopoly and international trade policy," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(3-4), pages 217-234, May.
  3. Clemens Fuest & Bernd Huber, 1999. "Tax Coordination and Unemployment," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 6(1), pages 7-26, February.
  4. Black, Dan A & Hoyt, William H, 1989. "Bidding for Firms," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(5), pages 1249-56, December.
  5. Naylor, Robin, 1998. "International trade and economic integration when labour markets are generally unionised," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 42(7), pages 1251-1267, July.
  6. Haufler, Andreas & Wooton, Ian, 1999. "Country size and tax competition for foreign direct investment," Munich Reprints in Economics 20408, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
  7. Richard B. Freeman, 2007. "Labor Market Institutions Around the World," NBER Working Papers 13242, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  8. Andrew Oswald, 1984. "Efficient Contracts are on the Labour Demand Curve: Theory and Facts," Working Papers 555, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section..
  9. Hans Jarle Kind & Helene Midelfart & Guttorm Schjelderup, 2000. "Competing for Capital in a "Lumpy" World," CESifo Working Paper Series 252, CESifo Group Munich.
  10. Arijit Mukherjee, 2008. "Unionised Labour Market and Strategic Production Decision of a Multinational," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 118(532), pages 1621-1639, October.
  11. Arjan Lejour & Harrie Verbon, 1996. "Capital mobility, wage bargaining, and social insurance policies in an economic union," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 3(4), pages 495-513, October.
  12. Ronald B. Davies, 2000. "State Tax Competition for Foreign Direct Investment: A Winnable War?," University of Oregon Economics Department Working Papers 2000-4, University of Oregon Economics Department, revised 01 Jul 2002.
  13. Fuest, Clemens & Huber, Bernd, 2000. "Why do governments subsidise investment and not employment?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 78(1-2), pages 171-192, October.
  14. Driffill, John & van der Ploeg, Frederick, 1995. " Trade Liberalization with Imperfect Competition in Goods and Labour Markets," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 97(2), pages 223-43, June.
  15. Ben Ferrett & Ian Wooton, 2010. "Competing for a duopoly: international trade and tax competition," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 43(3), pages 776-794, August.
  16. Borck, Rainald & Pflüger, Michael P., 2004. "Agglomeration and Tax Competition," IZA Discussion Papers 1033, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  17. Ignatius J. Horstmann & James R. Markusen, 1990. "Endogenous Market Structures in International Trade," NBER Working Papers 3283, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  18. Mezzetti, Claudio & Dinopoulos, Elias, 1991. "Domestic unionization and import competition," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(1-2), pages 79-100, August.
  19. Michael P. Devereux & Rachel Griffith & Alexander Klemm, 2002. "Corporate income tax reforms and international tax competition," Economic Policy, CEPR & CES & MSH, vol. 17(35), pages 449-495, October.
  20. Huizinga, H.P., 1993. "International market integration and union wage bargaining," Open Access publications from Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-155144, Tilburg University.
  21. James Brander & Paul Krugman, 1982. "A 'Reciprocal Dumping' Model of International Trade," Working Papers 513, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
  22. Kjell Erik Lommerud & Frode Meland & Lars Sørgard, 2002. "Unionized Oligopoly, Trade Liberalization and Location Choice," CESifo Working Paper Series 777, CESifo Group Munich.
  23. Robin Naylor & Michele Santoni, 2003. "Foreign direct investment and wage bargaining," The Journal of International Trade & Economic Development, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 12(1), pages 1-18.
  24. Mette Rose Skaksen, 2005. "Should Governments Subsidise Inward Foreign Direct Investment?," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 107(1), pages 123-140, 03.
  25. Jakob Roland Munch, 2003. "The Location of Firms in Unionized Countries," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 105(1), pages 49-72, 03.
  26. Fuest, Clemens & Huber, Bernd, 2000. "Why do governments subsidise investment and not employment?," Munich Reprints in Economics 20295, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
  27. Coughlin, Cletus C & Terza, Joseph V & Arromdee, Vachira, 1991. "State Characteristics and the Location of Foreign Direct Investment within the United States," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 73(4), pages 675-83, November.
  28. Leahy, Dermot & Montagna, Catia, 1999. "Unionisation and Foreign Direct Investment," CEPR Discussion Papers 2260, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  29. Fuest, Clemens & Huber, Bernd, 1999. "Tax Coordination and Unemployment," Munich Reprints in Economics 20298, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Nelly Exbrayat & Benny Geys, 2011. "Trade Integration and Business Tax Differentials : Theory and Evidence from OECD Countries," Working Papers 1123, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique (GATE), Centre national de la recherche scientifique (CNRS), Université Lyon 2, Ecole Normale Supérieure.
  2. Dominika Langenmayr & Andreas Haufler & Christian J. Bauer, 2012. "Should tax policy favor high- or low-productivity firms?," Working Papers 130, Bavarian Graduate Program in Economics (BGPE).
  3. Alexander Haupt & Tim Krieger, 2009. "The role of mobility in tax and subsidy competition," Working Papers CIE 21, University of Paderborn, CIE Center for International Economics.
  4. Mittermaier, Ferdinand & Rincke, Johannes, 2013. "Do countries compensate firms for international wage differentials?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 23-36.
  5. Exbrayat, Nelly & Geys, Benny, 2012. "Trade integration and business tax differentials: Evidence from OECD countries," Discussion Papers, Research Professorship & Project "The Future of Fiscal Federalism" SP II 2012-110, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB).
  6. Yuko Hashimoto & Konstantin Wacker, 2012. "The Role of Risk and Information for International Capital Flows," IMF Working Papers 12/242, International Monetary Fund.
  7. Nelly Exbrayat & Benny Geys, 2014. "Trade integration and corporate income tax differentials," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 21(2), pages 298-323, April.
  8. G. Cardullo & M. Conti & G. Sulis, 2012. "Sunk Capital, Unions and the Hold-Up Problem: Theory and Evidence from Sectoral Data," Working Paper CRENoS 201226, Centre for North South Economic Research, University of Cagliari and Sassari, Sardinia.
  9. Rocha-Akis, Silvia & Schöb, Ronnie, 2009. "Welfare policy in the presence of unionised labour and internationally mobile firms," Discussion Papers 2009/14, Free University Berlin, School of Business & Economics.
  10. Silvia Rocha-Akis, 2012. "The Pain and Gain of Offshoring: The Effects of Tax Progression in a Segmented Labour Market," CESifo Working Paper Series 3739, CESifo Group Munich.
  11. Johannes Becker & Andrea Schneider, 2014. "Bidding for Firms with Unknown Characteristics," CESifo Working Paper Series 4806, CESifo Group Munich.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ecj:econjl:v:121:y:2011:i:553:p:793-818. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing) or (Christopher F. Baum).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.