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Regional Tax Coordination and Foreign Direct Investment

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  • Wooton, Ian
  • Haufler, Andreas

Abstract

This Paper analyses the effects of a regionally coordinated profit tax in a model with three active countries, one of which is not part of the union, and a globally mobile firm. We show that regional tax coordination can lead to two types of welfare gains. First, for investments that would take place in the region in the absence of coordination, this measure can transfer location rents from the firm to the union. Second, by internalizing all of the union's benefits from foreign direct investment, a coordinated policy attracts more investment than when member states act in isolation. Consequently, tax levels may rise or fall under regional coordination.

Suggested Citation

  • Wooton, Ian & Haufler, Andreas, 2001. "Regional Tax Coordination and Foreign Direct Investment," CEPR Discussion Papers 3063, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:3063
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    Cited by:

    1. Facundo Albornoz & Gregory Corcos & Toby Kendall, 2007. "Subsidy Competition and the Mode of FDI: Acquisition vs Greenfield," Discussion Papers 05-15, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham.
    2. Haufler, Andreas & Wooton, Ian, 2006. "The effects of regional tax and subsidy coordination on foreign direct investment," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 285-305, February.
    3. FitzGerald, Valpy, 2002. "International tax cooperation and capital mobility," Revista CEPAL, Naciones Unidas Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL), August.
    4. Brulhart, Marius & Jametti, Mario, 2006. "Vertical versus horizontal tax externalities: An empirical test," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(10-11), pages 2027-2062, November.
    5. Clemens Fuest & Bernd Huber & Jack Mintz, 2003. "Capital Mobility and Tax Competition: A Survey," CESifo Working Paper Series 956, CESifo.
    6. Giuseppe Francesco Gori & Luca Lambertini & Alessandro Tampieri, 2014. "Trade costs, FDI incentives, and the intensity of price competition," International Journal of Economic Theory, The International Society for Economic Theory, vol. 10(4), pages 371-385, December.
    7. Facundo Albornoz & Grégory Corcos, 2005. "Subsidy competition in integrating economies," Working Papers halshs-00590785, HAL.
    8. Valpy Fitzgerald, 2002. "International Tax Co-operation and Capital Mobility," Oxford Development Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 30(3), pages 251-266.
    9. Osiris J. Parcero, 2009. "Optimal country's policy towards multinationals when local regions can choose between firm-specific and non-firm-specific policies," Working Papers 2009/34, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB).
    10. Leon Bettendorf & Albert Van Der Horst & Ruud A. De Mooij & Hendrik Vrijburg, 2010. "Corporate Tax Consolidation and Enhanced Cooperation in the European Union," Fiscal Studies, Institute for Fiscal Studies, vol. 31(4), pages 453-479, December.
    11. Krishanu Karmakar & Jorge Martinez-Vazquez, 2014. "Fiscal Competition versus Fiscal Harmonization: A Review of the Arguments," International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series, at AYSPS, GSU paper1431, International Center for Public Policy, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University.
    12. Joy Bhadury & H. Eiselt, 2012. "Optimizing subsidies for the location of distribution centers," The Annals of Regional Science, Springer;Western Regional Science Association, vol. 48(1), pages 247-261, February.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Tax competition; Regional coordination; International investment;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F15 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Economic Integration
    • F23 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - Multinational Firms; International Business
    • H73 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Interjurisdictional Differentials and Their Effects
    • H87 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - International Fiscal Issues; International Public Goods

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