Foreign direct investment and wage bargaining
Abstract
We derive the sub-game perfect Nash equilibria for the foreign direct investment (FDI) game played between two unionized firms. We show that FDI is less likely, ceteris paribus, the greater is union bargaining power and the more substitutable are the firms' products in the potential host country. We also examine the conditions under which the FDI game between firms will possess the characteristics of a Prisoners' Dilemma.Download Info
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Bibliographic Info
Article provided by Taylor and Francis Journals in its journal The Journal of International Trade & Economic Development.
Volume (Year): 12 (2003)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Pages: 1-18
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Handle: RePEc:taf:jitecd:v:12:y:2003:i:1:p:1-18
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For corrections or technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Michael McNulty).
Related research
Keywords: Foreign direct investment; oligopoly; wage bargaining;Other versions of this item:
- Robin Naylor & Michele Santoni, 1999. "Foreign direct investment and wage bargaining," CSGR Working papers series 41/99, Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation (CSGR), University of Warwick.
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Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.Cited by:
- Dermot Leahy & Catia Montagna, 2005. "Union Bargaining Power, Social Dumping, and Foreign Direct Investment," International Trade 0510001, EconWPA.
- Haufler, Andreas & Mittermaier, Ferdinand, 2008.
"Unionisation triggers tax incentives to attract foreign direct investment,"
Discussion Papers in Economics
3752, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
- Andreas Haufler & Ferdinand Mittermaier, 2011. "Unionisation Triggers Tax Incentives to Attract Foreign Direct Investment," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 121(553), pages 793-818, 06.
- Andreas Haufler & Ferdinand Mittermaier, 2008. "Unionisation Triggers Tax Incentives to Attract Foreign Direct Investment," CESifo Working Paper Series 2312, CESifo Group Munich.
- Andreas Haufler & Ferdinand Mittermaier, 2008. "Unionisation triggers tax incentives to attract foreign direct investment," Working Papers 052, Bavarian Graduate Program in Economics (BGPE).
- Frederic Palomino & Jozsef Sakovics, 2004.
"Inter-league competition for talent vs. competitive balance,"
ESE Discussion Papers
96, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
- Palomino, Frederic & Sakovics, Jozsef, 2004. "Inter-league competition for talent vs. competitive balance," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 22(6), pages 783-797, June.
- Junichiro Ishida & Noriaki Matsushima, 2008. "Domestic Competition and Foreign Direct Investment in Unionized Oligopoly," ISER Discussion Paper 0757, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University, revised Oct 2009.
- Brännlund, Runar & Nordström, Jonas & Svedin, Dick, 2004. "Foreign ownership and effects on employment and wages: The case of Sweden," UmeÃ¥ Economic Studies 638, Umeå University, Department of Economics, revised 01 Nov 2004.
- Domenico Buccella, 2011. "Labor unions and economic integration: A review," Económica, Departamento de Economía, Facultad de Ciencias Económicas, Universidad Nacional de La Plata, vol. 0, pages 25-89, January-D.
- Junichiro Ishida & Noriaki Matsushima, 2005. "FDI may help rival firms," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 6(22), pages 1-8.
- Choi, Kangsik, 2010. "The Timing of Endogenous Wage Setting under Bertrand Competition in a Unionized Mixed Duopoly," MPRA Paper 20205, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Palokangas, Tapio, 2003. "Foreign Direct Investment, Labour Market Regulation and Self-Interested Governments," IZA Discussion Papers 793, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Dermot Leahy & Catia Montagna, 2005. "Union legislation and export platform FDI," Journal of International Trade & Economic Development, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 14(4), pages 437-452.
- Tapio Palokangas, 2009. "Investment, expropriation, and unionization," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 10(1), pages 27-42, January.
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