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A Mixed Duopoly with a Lifetime Employment Contract as a Strategic Commitment

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  • Kazuhiro Ohnishi
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    Abstract

    This paper examines the behaviors of a profit-maximizing private firm and a socialwelfare- maximizing public firm in a mixed market model with a lifetime employment contract as a strategic commitment. The paper then shows that there exists an equilibrium in which the private firm enters into a lifetime employment contract with its employees while the public firm does not.

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    File URL: http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/mohr/fa/2006/00000062/00000001/art00005
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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen in its journal FinanzArchiv.

    Volume (Year): 62 (2006)
    Issue (Month): 1 (March)
    Pages: 108-123

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    Handle: RePEc:mhr:finarc:urn:sici:0015-2218(200603)62:1_108:amdwal_2.0.tx_2-o

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    Related research

    Keywords: mixed duopoly; lifetime employment contract; Cournot model;

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    Cited by:
    1. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:30:y:2010:i:1:p:309-314 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Kazuhiro Ohnishi, 2011. "A Quantity-Setting Mixed Duopoly with Inventory Investment as a Coordination Device," Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, vol. 12(1), pages 109-119, May.
    3. Kazuhiro Ohnishi, 2009. "Capacity Investment and Mixed Duopoly with State-Owned and Labor-Managed Firms," Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, vol. 10(1), pages 49-64, May.
    4. Kazuhiro Ohnishi, 2009. "Strategic Commitment and Three-Stage Games with Labour-Managed and Profit-Maximizing Firms," Finnish Economic Papers, Finnish Economic Association, vol. 22(2), pages 63-74, Autumn.

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