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When do first-movers have an advantage? A Stackelberg classroom experiment

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  • Robert Rebelein
  • Evsen Turkay

Abstract

The timing of moves can dramatically affect firm profits and market outcomes. When firms choose output quantities, there is a first-mover advantage, and when firms choose prices, there is a second-mover advantage. Students often find it difficult to understand the differences between these two situations. This classroom experiment simulates each scenario in a way that makes it easy for students to understand the theoretical reasons for the different possible outcomes. The authors have developed a two-firm classroom experiment where students first play a Stackelberg game in which firms sequentially choose production quantities and then a Stackelberg game in which firms sequentially choose prices. When choosing quantities, it is advantageous to move first, and when choosing prices, it is advantageous to wait.

Suggested Citation

  • Robert Rebelein & Evsen Turkay, 2016. "When do first-movers have an advantage? A Stackelberg classroom experiment," The Journal of Economic Education, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 47(3), pages 226-240, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:jeduce:v:47:y:2016:i:3:p:226-240
    DOI: 10.1080/00220485.2016.1179144
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Andreas Ortmann, 2003. "Bertrand Price Undercutting: A Brief Classroom Demonstration," The Journal of Economic Education, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 34(1), pages 21-26, January.
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    4. Steve Dowrick, 1986. "von Stackelberg and Cournot Duopoly: Choosing Roles," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 17(2), pages 251-260, Summer.
    5. Michael Watts & William E. Becker, 2008. "A Little More than Chalk and Talk: Results from a Third National Survey of Teaching Methods in Undergraduate Economics Courses," The Journal of Economic Education, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 39(3), pages 273-286, July.
    6. Charles A. Holt, 1999. "Teaching Economics with Classroom Experiments: A Symposium," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 65(3), pages 603-610, January.
    7. Steven R. Beckman, 2003. "Cournot and Bertrand Games," The Journal of Economic Education, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 34(1), pages 27-35, January.
    8. Bulow, Jeremy I & Geanakoplos, John D & Klemperer, Paul D, 1985. "Multimarket Oligopoly: Strategic Substitutes and Complements," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(3), pages 488-511, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Neligh, Nathaniel, 2020. "Vying for dominance: An experiment in dynamic network formation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 178(C), pages 719-739.

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