Rational Choice and the Price of Marriage
AbstractThis paper accepts the thesis that marriage decisions reflect rational behavior based on weighing benefits and costs. It develops a concept of a marriage price that measures the excess services one spouse provides to the other when there are differences in the number of men and women seeking marriage partners. This price includes income, time allocation to household activities, and control over forms of intimacy and beauty styles. In contrast to Grossbard-Shechtman's strict choice model, this model highlights the patriarchal privileges of husbands. It identifies some of the factors which affect marriage price in the United States and assesses the impact of recent U.S. governmental initiatives to increase marriage rates, including the male employment proposals made by William Julius Wilson. The theoretical model developed here shows that proposals that increase the personal value women place on marriage raise the marriage price they must pay, as well as increasing marriage rates.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Taylor & Francis Journals in its journal Feminist Economics.
Volume (Year): 4 (1998)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
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