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Intrahousehold allocation of financial resources: evidence from South Korean individual bank accounts

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  • Jungmin Lee

    ()

  • Mark L. Pocock

    ()

Abstract

Using individual bank account data from South Korea, where joint accounts are rare and the legal system emphasizes the individuality of financial transactions, we examine the distribution of financial resources between spouses within households. We find that each member’s share of household savings depends on the balance of bargaining power. We also find that the wife’s bargaining power increases total household savings. The findings deviate from the unitary model. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2007

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s11150-007-9004-3
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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal Review of Economics of the Household.

Volume (Year): 5 (2007)
Issue (Month): 1 (March)
Pages: 41-58

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Handle: RePEc:kap:reveho:v:5:y:2007:i:1:p:41-58

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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=109451

Related research

Keywords: Savings; Household bargaining; D1; E2;

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References

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  1. Bourguignon, F. & Browning, M. & Chiappori, P.A. & Lechene, V., 1992. "Intra Household Allocation of Consumption : A Model and Some Evidence from French Data," DELTA Working Papers 92-08, DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure).
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  6. Martin Browning & Pierre-André Chiappori & Valérie Lechene, 2004. "Collective and Unitary Models: a Clarification," CAM Working Papers 2004-15, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Applied Microeconometrics.
  7. Martin Browning & Annamaria Lusardi, 1996. "Household Saving: Micro Theories and Micro Facts," Discussion Papers 96-01, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
  8. Phipps, S.A. & Burton, P.S., 1992. "What's Mine is Yours?: The Influence of Male and Female Incomes on Patterns of Household Expenditure," Department of Economics at Dalhousie University working papers archive 92-12, Dalhousie, Department of Economics.
  9. Maurizio Mazzocco, 2004. "Saving, Risk Sharing, and Preferences for Risk," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(4), pages 1169-1182, September.
  10. Thomas, D., 1989. "Intra-Household Resource Allocation: An Inferential Approach," Papers 586, Yale - Economic Growth Center.
  11. Pitt, Mark M. & Khandker, Shahidur R. & Cartwright, Jennifer, 2003. "Does micro-credit empower women : evidence from Bangladesh," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2998, The World Bank.
  12. Johnson, William R & Skinner, Jonathan, 1986. "Labor Supply and Marital Separation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(3), pages 455-69, June.
  13. Robert A. Pollak, 2005. "Bargaining Power in Marriage: Earnings, Wage Rates and Household Production," NBER Working Papers 11239, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  14. Grossbard-Shechtman, Shoshana Amyra, 1984. "A Theory of Allocation of Time in Markets for Labour and Marriage," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 94(376), pages 863-82, December.
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  16. Jianakoplos, Nancy Ammon & Bernasek, Alexandra, 1998. "Are Women More Risk Averse?," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 36(4), pages 620-30, October.
  17. John Hoddinott & Lawrence Haddad, 1994. "Does female income share influence household expenditures? Evidence from the Côte d'Ivoire," CSAE Working Paper Series 1994-17, Centre for the Study of African Economies, University of Oxford.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. GRABKA Markus & MARCUS Jan & SIERMINSKA Eva, 2013. "Wealth distribution within couples and financial decision making," CEPS/INSTEAD Working Paper Series 2013-02, CEPS/INSTEAD.
  2. Amuedo-Dorantes, Catalina & Bonke, Jens & Grossbard, Shoshana, 2010. "Income Pooling and Household Division of Labor: Evidence from Danish Couples," IZA Discussion Papers 5418, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  3. Shoshana Amyra Grossbard & Alfredo Marvao Pereira, 2010. "Will Women Save more than Men? A Theoretical Model of Savings and Marriage," CESifo Working Paper Series 3146, CESifo Group Munich.
  4. Grabka, Markus M. & Marcus, Jan & Sierminska, Eva, 2013. "Wealth Distribution within Couples," IZA Discussion Papers 7637, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  5. Shoshana Amyra Grossbard & Alfredo Marvão Pereira, 2013. "Savings and Economies of Marriage: Intra-Marriage Financial Distributions as Determinants of Savings," Working Papers 95, Department of Economics, College of William and Mary.
  6. Shoshana Grossbard & Elena Stancanelli, 2010. "Whose time? Who saves? Introduction to a special issue on couples’ savings, time use and children," Review of Economics of the Household, Springer, vol. 8(3), pages 289-296, September.

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