Strategic Weight Within Couples: A Microsimulation Approach
AbstractIndividual strategic weight plays an important role in the intra-household allocation of resources; however, empirical studies invariably find such weight difficult to define in a plausible and computable way, given the available data. This paper proposes a framework for the calculation of household members' strategic weight that can be easily computed using a microsimulation model. The index proposed for each member as the share of resources the household would lose should he or she abandon it. The causes of strategic weight differentials are analysed in four EU countries with significantly different employment structure and tax-benefit systems (Finland, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom), using EUROMOD, an integrated EU-15 microsimulation model.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by FEDEA in its series Working Papers with number 2006-27.
Date of creation: Dec 2006
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Other versions of this item:
- Kristian Orsini & Amadéo Spadaro, 2006. "Strategic weight within couples: a microsimulation approach," PSE Working Papers halshs-00590395, HAL.
- NEP-ALL-2006-11-18 (All new papers)
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