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Insider trading and portfolio structure in experimental asset markets with a long-lived asset

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Author Info
J.P. Krahnen, C. Rieck, E. Theissen

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Abstract

Results are reported of a series of nine market experiments with asymmetric information and a fundamental value process that is more 'realistic' than those in previous experiments. Both a call market institution and a continuous double auction mechanism are employed. Considerable pricing inefficiencies that are only partially exploited by insiders were found. The magnitude of insider gains is analysed separately for each experiment. Support is found for the hypothesis that the continuous double auction leads to more efficient outcomes. Finally, evidence of an endowment effect is presented: the initial portfolio structure influences the final asset holdings of experimental subjects.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Taylor and Francis Journals in its journal The European Journal of Finance.

Volume (Year): 5 (1999)
Issue (Month): 1 (March)
Pages: 29-50
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Handle: RePEc:taf:eurjfi:v:5:y:1999:i:1:p:29-50

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Related research
Keywords: Experimental Asset Markets; Market Efficiency; Market Institutions; Endowment Effect;

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Fama, Eugene F, 1970. "Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 25(2), pages 383-417, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Plott, Charles R & Sunder, Shyam, 1982. "Efficiency of Experimental Security Markets with Insider Information: An Application of Rational-Expectations Models," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 90(4), pages 663-98, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. De Long, J Bradford & Andrei Shleifer & Lawrence H. Summers & Robert J. Waldmann, 1990. "Noise Trader Risk in Financial Markets," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(4), pages 703-38, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Sunder, S., 1992. "Lower Bounds for Efficiency of Surplus Extraction in Double Auctions," GSIA Working Papers 1992-17, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business.
  5. Jan Krahnen & Martin Weber, 2001. "Marketmaking in the Laboratory: Does Competition Matter?," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 4(1), pages 55-85, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. Schnitzlein, Charles R, 1996. " Call and Continuous Trading Mechanisms under Asymmetric Information: An Experimental Investigation," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 51(2), pages 613-36, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Krahnen, Jan Pieter & Rieck, Christian & Theissen, Erik, 1997. "Inferring risk attitudes from certainty equivalents: Some lessons from an experimental study," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 18(5), pages 469-486, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Gode, Dhananjay K & Sunder, Shyam, 1993. "Allocative Efficiency of Markets with Zero-Intelligence Traders: Market as a Partial Substitute for Individual Rationality," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 101(1), pages 119-37, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Smith, Vernon L, et al, 1982. "Competitive Market Institutions: Double Auctions vs. Sealed Bid-Offer Auctions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(1), pages 58-77, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Friedman, Daniel, 1993. "How Trading Institutions Affect Financial Market Performance: Some Laboratory Evidence," Economic Inquiry, Oxford University Press, vol. 31(3), pages 410-35, July.
  11. Kahneman, Daniel & Knetsch, Jack L & Thaler, Richard H, 1990. "Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(6), pages 1325-48, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Van Boening, Mark V. & Williams, Arlington W. & LaMaster, Shawn, 1993. "Price bubbles and crashes in experimental call markets," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 41(2), pages 179-185. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. J. Bradford De Long & Andrei Shleifer & Lawrence H. Summers & Robert J. Waldmann,, . "The Survival of Noise Traders in Financial Markets," J. Bradford De Long's Working Papers _123, University of California at Berkeley, Economics Department. [Downloadable!]
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  14. Smith, Vernon L & Suchanek, Gerry L & Williams, Arlington W, 1988. "Bubbles, Crashes, and Endogenous Expectations in Experimental Spot Asset Markets," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(5), pages 1119-51, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Holden, Craig W & Subrahmanyam, Avanidhar, 1992. " Long-Lived Private Information and Imperfect Competition," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 47(1), pages 247-70, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Jürgen Huber & Matthias Sutter & Michael Kirchler, 2004. "Is more information always better? Experimental financial markets with asymmetric information," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2005-13, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group. [Downloadable!]
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