Call and Continuous Trading Mechanisms under Asymmetric Information: An Experimental Investigation
AbstractThe author examines the relative performance of call and continuous auctions under asymmetric information by manipulating trading rules and information sets in laboratory asset markets. He finds significant differences in an environment that extends the A. S. Kyle (1985) framework to permit the exogenous liquidity trading motive to have a natural economic interpretation. The adverse selection costs incurred by noise traders are significantly lower under the call auction, despite no significant reduction in average price efficiency. This result suggests that discussions of the costs and benefits of insider trading should take place within the context of a specific trading mechanism. Copyright 1996 by American Finance Association.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by American Finance Association in its journal Journal of Finance.
Volume (Year): 51 (1996)
Issue (Month): 2 (June)
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- Gerke, Wolfgang & Arneth, Stefan & Syha, Christine, 2000. "The impact of the order book privilege on traders' behavior and the market process: An experimental study," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 21(2), pages 167-189, April.
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Working Paper Series: Finance and Accounting
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- Majois, Christophe, 2010. "Order aggressiveness and the diagonal effect in experimental double auction markets," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 107(2), pages 304-309, May.
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