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Call and Continuous Trading Mechanisms under Asymmetric Information: An Experimental Investigation

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  • Schnitzlein, Charles R
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    Abstract

    The author examines the relative performance of call and continuous auctions under asymmetric information by manipulating trading rules and information sets in laboratory asset markets. He finds significant differences in an environment that extends the A. S. Kyle (1985) framework to permit the exogenous liquidity trading motive to have a natural economic interpretation. The adverse selection costs incurred by noise traders are significantly lower under the call auction, despite no significant reduction in average price efficiency. This result suggests that discussions of the costs and benefits of insider trading should take place within the context of a specific trading mechanism. Copyright 1996 by American Finance Association.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by American Finance Association in its journal Journal of Finance.

    Volume (Year): 51 (1996)
    Issue (Month): 2 (June)
    Pages: 613-36

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    Handle: RePEc:bla:jfinan:v:51:y:1996:i:2:p:613-36

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    Cited by:
    1. Gerke, Wolfgang & Arneth, Stefan & Syha, Christine, 2000. "The impact of the order book privilege on traders' behavior and the market process: An experimental study," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 21(2), pages 167-189, April.
    2. Majois, Christophe, 2010. "Order aggressiveness and the diagonal effect in experimental double auction markets," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 107(2), pages 304-309, May.
    3. Fehr, Ernst & Zehnder, Christian, 2009. "Reputation and Credit Market Formation: How Relational Incentives and Legal Contract Enforcement Interact," IZA Discussion Papers 4351, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
    4. Oehler, Andreas & Unser, Matthias, 1998. "Market Transparency and Call Markets," Discussion Papers 6, University of Bamberg, Chair of Finance.
    5. Chang, Rosita P. & Rhee, S. Ghon & Stone, Gregory R. & Tang, Ning, 2008. "How does the call market method affect price efficiency? Evidence from the Singapore Stock Market," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 32(10), pages 2205-2219, October.
    6. Madhavan, Ananth & Panchapagesan, Venkatesh, 2000. "Price Discovery in Auction Markets: A Look Inside the Black Box," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 13(3), pages 627-58.
    7. Chelley-Steeley, Patricia, 2009. "Price synchronicity: The closing call auction and the London stock market," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 19(5), pages 777-791, December.
    8. Weiyu Kuo & Yu‐Ching Li, 2011. "Trading Mechanisms and Market Quality: Call Markets versus Continuous Auction Markets," International Review of Finance, International Review of Finance Ltd., vol. 11(4), pages 417-444, December.
    9. J. P. Krahnen & C. Rieck & E. Theissen, 1999. "Insider trading and portfolio structure in experimental asset markets with a long-lived asset," The European Journal of Finance, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 5(1), pages 29-50.
    10. Flood, M.D. & Koedijk, C.G. & van Dijk, M.A. & van Leeuwen, I.W., 2002. "Dividing the Pie," ERIM Report Series Research in Management ERS-2002-101-F&A, Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM), ERIM is the joint research institute of the Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University and the Erasmus School of Economics (ESE) at Erasmus University Rotterdam.
    11. Gu, Gao-Feng & Ren, Fei & Ni, Xiao-Hui & Chen, Wei & Zhou, Wei-Xing, 2010. "Empirical regularities of opening call auction in Chinese stock market," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 389(2), pages 278-286.
    12. Rosita P. Chang & Shuh-Tzy Hsu & Nai-Kuan Huang & S. Ghon Rhee, 1999. "The Effects of Trading Methods on Volatility and Liquidity: Evidence from the Taiwan Stock Exchange," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 26(1-2), pages 137-170.
    13. Comerton-Forde, Carole, 1999. "Do trading rules impact on market efficiency? A comparison of opening procedures on the Australian and Jakarta Stock Exchanges," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 7(5), pages 495-521, December.

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