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Insider Trading and Portfolio Structure in Experimental Asset Markets with a Long Lived Asset

  • Jan Pieter Krahnen


  • Christian Rieck
  • Erik Theissen


Results are reported of a series of nine market experiments with asymmetric information and a fundamental value process that is more 'realistic' than those in previous experiments. Both a call market institution and a continuous double auction mechanism are employed. Considerable pricing inefficiencies that are only partially exploited by insiders were found. The magnitude of insider gains is analysed separately for each experiment. Support is found for the hypothesis that the continuous double auction leads to more efficient outcomes. Finally, evidence of an endowment effect is presented: the initial portfolio structure influences the final asset holdings of experimental subjects.

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Paper provided by Department of Finance, Goethe University Frankfurt am Main in its series Working Paper Series: Finance and Accounting with number 1.

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Date of creation: Mar 1999
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fra:franaf:1
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  1. J. Bradford De Long & Andrei Shleifer & Lawrence H. Summers & Robert J. Waldmann,, . "The Survival of Noise Traders in Financial Markets," J. Bradford De Long's Working Papers _123, University of California at Berkeley, Economics Department.
  2. Jan Krahnen & Martin Weber, 2001. "Marketmaking in the Laboratory: Does Competition Matter?," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 4(1), pages 55-85, June.
  3. Fama, Eugene F, 1970. "Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 25(2), pages 383-417, May.
  4. Gode, Dhananjay K & Sunder, Shyam, 1993. "Allocative Efficiency of Markets with Zero-Intelligence Traders: Market as a Partial Substitute for Individual Rationality," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 101(1), pages 119-37, February.
  5. Smith, Vernon L, et al, 1982. "Competitive Market Institutions: Double Auctions vs. Sealed Bid-Offer Auctions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(1), pages 58-77, March.
  6. Smith, Vernon L & Suchanek, Gerry L & Williams, Arlington W, 1988. "Bubbles, Crashes, and Endogenous Expectations in Experimental Spot Asset Markets," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(5), pages 1119-51, September.
  7. De Long, J Bradford & Andrei Shleifer & Lawrence H. Summers & Robert J. Waldmann, 1990. "Noise Trader Risk in Financial Markets," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(4), pages 703-38, August.
  8. Gode, D.K. & Sunder, S., 1991. "Allocative Efficiency of Markets with Zero Intelligence (Z1) Traders: Market as a Partial Substitute for Individual Rationality," GSIA Working Papers 1992-16, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business.
  9. Plott, Charles R & Sunder, Shyam, 1982. "Efficiency of Experimental Security Markets with Insider Information: An Application of Rational-Expectations Models," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 90(4), pages 663-98, August.
  10. Krahnen, Jan Pieter & Rieck, Christian & Theissen, Erik, 1997. "Inferring risk attitudes from certainty equivalents: Some lessons from an experimental study," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 18(5), pages 469-486, September.
  11. Friedman, Daniel, 1993. "How Trading Institutions Affect Financial Market Performance: Some Laboratory Evidence," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 31(3), pages 410-35, July.
  12. Van Boening, Mark V. & Williams, Arlington W. & LaMaster, Shawn, 1993. "Price bubbles and crashes in experimental call markets," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 41(2), pages 179-185.
  13. Sunder, S., 1992. "Lower Bounds for Efficiency of Surplus Extraction in Double Auctions," GSIA Working Papers 1992-17, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business.
  14. Kahneman, Daniel & Knetsch, Jack L & Thaler, Richard H, 1990. "Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(6), pages 1325-48, December.
  15. Holden, Craig W & Subrahmanyam, Avanidhar, 1992. " Long-Lived Private Information and Imperfect Competition," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 47(1), pages 247-70, March.
  16. Schnitzlein, Charles R, 1996. " Call and Continuous Trading Mechanisms under Asymmetric Information: An Experimental Investigation," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 51(2), pages 613-36, June.
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