In this paper we study information revelation on asset markets with endogenous and exogenous information. Our results indicate that superior information can only be exploited in the beginning of trading. Information disseminates on the market and informational advantages are counter-balanced over time. This result holds true for both, exogenous and precise endogenous information. Vague endogenous information, however, has no impact on individual payo . Furthermore, we find that excessive trading decreases individual earnings.
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Paper provided by Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group in its series Papers on Strategic Interaction with number
2002-03.
Length: 10 pages Date of creation: Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:esi:discus:2002-03
Note: The authors acknowledge financial support by the University of Vienna under the project title “600 Jahre Universit¨at Wien”. Thanks are due to Tarek El-Sehity, Eva Hofmann, and Herbert Schwarzenberger, who helped to run the experiment at the University of Vienna. Valuable comments by Werner G¨uth, Hans Haumer, Christian Helmenstein, Erich Kirchler, and Erik Theissen are gratefully acknowledged. Contact details of provider: Postal: Kahlaische Strasse 10, D-07745 Jena Phone: +49-3641-68 65 Fax: +49-3641-68 69 90 Web page: http://www.econ.mpg.de/ More information through EDIRC
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