Discrimination in matchmaking: evidence from the price policy of a French marriage bureau
AbstractThis article shows how a matchmaking agency may improve the quality of serious meetings between individuals seeking long-term relationship, thanks to a price discrimination policy. Its filtering is based on objective and official characteristics (sex, age and contract's environment) and on implicit criteria: the few asked characteristics by its clients.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Taylor & Francis Journals in its journal Applied Economics.
Volume (Year): 36 (2004)
Issue (Month): 7 ()
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