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Nash implementable domains for the Borda count

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  • Clemens Puppe

    ()

  • Attila Tasnádi

    ()

Abstract

We characterize the preference domains on which the Borda count satisfies Maskin monotonicity. The basic concept is the notion of a "cyclic permutation domain" which arises by fixing one particular ordering of alternatives and including all its cyclic permutations. The cyclic permutation domains are exactly the maximal domains on which the Borda count is strategy-proof (when combined with every tie breaking rule). It turns out that the Borda count is monotonic on a larger class of domains. We show that the maximal domains on which the Borda count satisfies Maskin monotonicity are the "cyclically nested permutation domains." These are the preference domains which can be obtained from the cyclic permutation domains in an appropriate recursive way.

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s00355-007-0286-4
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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal Social Choice and Welfare.

Volume (Year): 31 (2008)
Issue (Month): 3 (October)
Pages: 367-392

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Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:31:y:2008:i:3:p:367-392

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  1. Muller, Eitan & Satterthwaite, Mark A., 1977. "The equivalence of strong positive association and strategy-proofness," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 14(2), pages 412-418, April.
  2. Bochet, Olivier & Storcken, Ton, 2006. "Maximal Domains for Strategy-Proof or Maskin Monotonic Choice Rules," Research Memoranda 003, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization.
  3. Kalai, Ehud & Ritz, Zvi, 1980. "Characterization of the private alternatives domains admitting arrow social welfare functions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 23-36, February.
  4. Martin Barbie & Clemens Puppe & Attila Tasnadi, 2003. "Non-Manipulable Domains for the Borda Count," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse13_2003, University of Bonn, Germany.
  5. Orhan Erdem & M. Sanver, 2005. "Minimal monotonic extensions of scoring rules," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 25(1), pages 31-42, October.
  6. Maskin, Eric, 1999. "Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 66(1), pages 23-38, January.
  7. Ehud Kalai & Eitan Muller, 1977. "Characterization of Domains Admitting Nondictatorial Social Welfare Functions and Nonmanipulable Voting Procedures," Discussion Papers 234, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  8. M. Sanver, 2009. "Strategy-proofness of the plurality rule over restricted domains," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 39(3), pages 461-471, June.
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