Monotonic incompatibility between electing and ranking
AbstractBorda proposed to assign points to each of m candidates. Condorcet proposed to assign points to each of m! rankings of candidates. One is appropriate for electing, the other for ranking. They satisfy different types of monotonicity that are incompatible.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Economics Letters.
Volume (Year): 105 (2009)
Issue (Month): 2 (November)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolet
Borda Condorcet Incompatibility Electing Ranking;
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