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Judge:Don't Vote!

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  • Michel Balinski

    (Department of Economics, Ecole Polytechnique - CNRS : UMR7176 - Polytechnique - X)

  • Rida Laraki

    (Department of Economics, Ecole Polytechnique - CNRS : UMR7176 - Polytechnique - X)

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    Abstract

    This article explains why the traditional model of the theory of social choice misrepresents reality, it cannot lead to acceptable methods of ranking and electing in any case, and a more realistic model leads inevitably to one method of ranking and electing—majority judgment—that best meets the traditional criteria of what constitutes a good method.

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    File URL: http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/docs/00/53/69/68/PDF/cahier_de_recherche_2010-27.pdf
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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by HAL in its series Working Papers with number hal-00536968.

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    Date of creation: 18 Nov 2010
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    Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-00536968

    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00536968/en/
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    Related research

    Keywords: Arrow's paradox ; Condorcet's paradox ; Majority judgment ; Skating ; Social choice ; Strategic manipulation ; Voting;

    References

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    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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    1. Zitzewitz, Eric, 2002. "Nationalism in Winter Sports Judging and Its Lessons for Organizational Decision Making," Research Papers, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business 1796, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
    2. Balinski, Michel & Jennings, Andrew & Laraki, Rida, 2009. "Monotonic incompatibility between electing and ranking," Economics Letters, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 105(2), pages 145-147, November.
    3. Michel Balinski & Andrew Jennings & Rida Laraki, 2008. "Monotonic Incompatibility Between Electing and Ranking," Working Papers hal-00339030, HAL.
    4. Michel Balinski & Rida Laraki, 2007. "Election by Majority Judgement: Experimental Evidence," Working Papers hal-00243076, HAL.
    5. Hammond, Peter J, 1976. "Equity, Arrow's Conditions, and Rawls' Difference Principle," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 44(4), pages 793-804, July.
    6. Michel Balinski & Rida Laraki, 2006. "A Theory of Measuring, Electing and Ranking," Working Papers hal-00243040, HAL.
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