AbstractThis article explains why the traditional model of the theory of social choice misrepresents reality, it cannot lead to acceptable methods of ranking and electing in any case, and a more realistic model leads inevitably to one method of ranking and electing—majority judgment—that best meets the traditional criteria of what constitutes a good method.
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Date of creation: 18 Nov 2010
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Arrow's paradox ; Condorcet's paradox ; Majority judgment ; Skating ; Social choice ; Strategic manipulation ; Voting;
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- Zitzewitz, Eric, 2002.
"Nationalism in Winter Sports Judging and Its Lessons for Organizational Decision Making,"
Research Papers, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business
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- Balinski, Michel & Jennings, Andrew & Laraki, Rida, 2009. "Monotonic incompatibility between electing and ranking," Economics Letters, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 105(2), pages 145-147, November.
- Michel Balinski & Andrew Jennings & Rida Laraki, 2008. "Monotonic Incompatibility Between Electing and Ranking," Working Papers hal-00339030, HAL.
- Michel Balinski & Rida Laraki, 2007. "Election by Majority Judgement: Experimental Evidence," Working Papers hal-00243076, HAL.
- Hammond, Peter J, 1976. "Equity, Arrow's Conditions, and Rawls' Difference Principle," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 44(4), pages 793-804, July.
- Michel Balinski & Rida Laraki, 2006. "A Theory of Measuring, Electing and Ranking," Working Papers hal-00243040, HAL.
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