Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

Non-manipulable domains for the Borda count

Contents:

Author Info

  • Martin Barbie
  • Clemens Puppe

    ()

  • Attila Tasnádi

Abstract

We characterize the preference domains on which the Borda count satisfies Arrow’s “independence of irrelevant alternatives” condition. Under a weak richness condition, these domains are obtained by fixing one preference ordering and including all its cyclic permutations (“Condorcet cycles”). We then ask on which domains the Borda count is non-manipulable. It turns out that it is non-manipulable on a broader class of domains when combined with appropriately chosen tie-breaking rules. On the other hand, we also prove that the rich domains on which the Borda count is non-manipulable for all possible tie-breaking rules are again the cyclic permutation domains. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2006

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s00199-004-0603-4
Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 27 (2006)
Issue (Month): 2 (January)
Pages: 411-430

as in new window
Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:27:y:2006:i:2:p:411-430

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00199/index.htm

Order Information:
Web: http://link.springer.de/orders.htm

Related research

Keywords: Voting; Borda count; Strategy-proofness; Restricted domains.;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

References

No references listed on IDEAS
You can help add them by filling out this form.

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. M. Sanver & William Zwicker, 2012. "Monotonicity properties and their adaptation to irresolute social choice rules," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 39(2), pages 371-398, July.
  2. M. Sanver, 2009. "Strategy-proofness of the plurality rule over restricted domains," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 39(3), pages 461-471, June.
  3. Sanver, M. Remzi, 2008. "Nash implementability of the plurality rule over restricted domains," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 99(2), pages 298-300, May.
  4. Marc Vorsatz, 2008. "Scoring rules on dichotomous preferences," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 31(1), pages 151-162, June.
  5. Puppe, Clemens & Tasnádi, Attila, 2006. "Nash implementable domains for the Borda count," MPRA Paper 775, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  6. Ollár, Mariann, 2010. "Monotonicity and robustness of majority rule," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 107(2), pages 288-290, May.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:27:y:2006:i:2:p:411-430. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Guenther Eichhorn) or (Christopher F Baum).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.