Building blocks in the economics of mandates
AbstractThe paper constructs an asymmetric information model to investugate the efficiency and equity cases for government mandated benefits. A mandate can improve workers' ibsurance, and may also redistribute in favour of more "deserving" workers.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Portuguese Economic Journal.
Volume (Year): 5 (2006)
Issue (Month): 2 (August)
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Web page: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/10258/index.htm
Other versions of this item:
- John T. Addison & C. R. Barrett & W. S. Siebert, 2005. "Building Blocks in the Economics of Mandates," GEMF Working Papers 2005-16, GEMF - Faculdade de Economia, Universidade de Coimbra.
- Addison, J.T. & Barrett, C.R. & Siebert, W.S., 2000. "Building Blocks in the Economics of Mandates," Discussion Papers 00-07, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham.
- Addison, John T. & Barrett, C. R. & Siebert, W. Stanley, 2005. "Building Blocks in the Economics of Mandates," IZA Discussion Papers 1866, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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