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A choice of auction format in seller cheating: a signaling game analysis

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Author Info
Takahiro Watanabe ()
Takehiko Yamato ()
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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s00199-007-0262-3
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Article provided by Springer in its journal Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 36 (2008)
Issue (Month): 1 (July)
Pages: 57-80
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Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:36:y:2008:i:1:p:57-80

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Related research
Keywords: Auction Cheating Signaling game C72 D44 D82

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. McAfee, R Preston & McMillan, John, 1987. "Auctions and Bidding," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 25(2), pages 699-738, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Yokoo, Makoto & Sakurai, Yuko & Matsubara, Shigeo, 2004. "The effect of false-name bids in combinatorial auctions: new fraud in internet auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 174-188, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Rothkopf, Michael H & Harstad, Ronald M, 1995. "Two Models of Bid-Taker Cheating in Vickrey Auctions," Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 68(2), pages 257-67, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Graham, Daniel A. & Marshall, Robert C. & Richard, Jean-Francois, 1990. "Phantom bidding against heterogeneous bidders," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 32(1), pages 13-17, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Indranil Chakraborty & Georgia Kosmopoulou, 2004. "Auctions with shill bidding," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 24(2), pages 271-287, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Milgrom, Paul R & Weber, Robert J, 1982. "A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(5), pages 1089-1122, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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This page was last updated on 2008-8-31.

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