Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

More on Phantom Bidding

Contents:

Author Info

  • Ruqu Wang

    ()
    (Queen's University)

  • Parimal Kanti Bag

    (Univeristy of Liverpool, Liverpool UK)

  • Emim Murat Dinlersoz

    (University of Rochester, Rochester N.Y. USA)

Abstract

A phantom bidding model is analyzed for a sale auction. The following questions are addressed: the effects of phantom bidding on overall social welfare and buyers' profits. It is shown that social welfare may increase or decrease as the auctioneer switches from the fixed reserve price policy to phantom bidding. The buyers' profits will increase whenever social welfare increases.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://qed.econ.queensu.ca/working_papers/papers/qed_wp_976.pdf
File Function: First version 1998
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Queen's University, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 976.

as in new window
Length: 7 pages
Date of creation: Oct 1998
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:qed:wpaper:976

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Kingston, Ontario, K7L 3N6
Phone: (613) 533-2250
Fax: (613) 533-6668
Email:
Web page: http://qed.econ.queensu.ca/
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords: English Auction; Phantom Bidding; Fixed/Flexible Reserve Price;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

References

No references listed on IDEAS
You can help add them by filling out this form.

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Laurent Lamy, 2010. ""Upping the ante": How to design efficient auctions with entry?," PSE Working Papers halshs-00564888, HAL.
  2. Georgia Kosmopoulou & Dakshina G. De Silva, 2005. "The Effect of Shill Bidding upon Prices: Experimental Evidence," Experimental 0512002, EconWPA.
  3. repec:hal:wpaper:halshs-00564888 is not listed on IDEAS
  4. Takahiro Watanabe & Takehiko Yamato, 2008. "A choice of auction format in seller cheating: a signaling game analysis," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 36(1), pages 57-80, July.
  5. Gustavo Rodriguez, 2012. "Sequential auctions with imperfect quantity commitment," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 49(1), pages 143-173, January.
  6. Itai Sher, 2008. "Optimal Shill Bidding in the VCG Mechanism," Working Papers 2008-4, University of Minnesota, Department of Economics, revised 05 2009.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:qed:wpaper:976. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Mark Babcock).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.