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Author Info

  • Ruqu Wang

    ()
    (Department of Economics, Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario, K7L 3N6, CANADA)

  • Emin Murat Dinlersoz

    ()
    (Department of Economics, University of Rochester, Rochester, NY 14627-0156, USA)

  • Parimal Kanti Bag

    ()
    (Department of Economics, Birkbeck College, University of London, 7-15 Gresse St., London W1P 2LL, UK)

Abstract

A phantom bidding model is analyzed for a sale auction. The following issues are addressed: the effects of phantom bidding on overall social welfare and buyers' profits. It is shown that social welfare may increase or decrease as the auctioneer switches from the fixed reserve price policy to phantom bidding. The buyers' profits will increase whenever social welfare increases.

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File URL: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00199/papers/0015003/00150701.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 15 (2000)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
Pages: 701-707

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Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:15:y:2000:i:3:p:701-707

Note: Received: November 4, 1998; revised version: February 8, 1999
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Web page: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00199/index.htm

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Related research

Keywords: English auction; Phantom bidding; Fixed/flexible reserve price.;

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Cited by:
  1. Itai Sher, 2012. "Optimal shill bidding in the VCG mechanism," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 50(2), pages 341-387, June.
  2. repec:hal:wpaper:halshs-00564888 is not listed on IDEAS
  3. Kosmopoulou, Georgia & De Silva, Dakshina G., 2007. "The effect of shill bidding upon prices: Experimental evidence," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 291-313, April.
  4. Laurent Lamy, 2010. ""Upping the ante": How to design efficient auctions with entry?," PSE Working Papers halshs-00564888, HAL.
  5. Gustavo Rodriguez, 2012. "Sequential auctions with imperfect quantity commitment," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 49(1), pages 143-173, January.
  6. Takahiro Watanabe & Takehiko Yamato, 2008. "A choice of auction format in seller cheating: a signaling game analysis," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 36(1), pages 57-80, July.

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