More on phantom bidding
AbstractA phantom bidding model is analyzed for a sale auction. The following issues are addressed: the effects of phantom bidding on overall social welfare and buyers' profits. It is shown that social welfare may increase or decrease as the auctioneer switches from the fixed reserve price policy to phantom bidding. The buyers' profits will increase whenever social welfare increases.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Economic Theory.
Volume (Year): 15 (2000)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
Note: Received: November 4, 1998; revised version: February 8, 1999
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Web page: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00199/index.htm
Other versions of this item:
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions
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- Laurent Lamy, 2010. ""Upping the ante": How to design efficient auctions with entry?," PSE Working Papers halshs-00564888, HAL.
- Kosmopoulou, Georgia & De Silva, Dakshina G., 2007.
"The effect of shill bidding upon prices: Experimental evidence,"
International Journal of Industrial Organization,
Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 291-313, April.
- Georgia Kosmopoulou & Dakshina G. De Silva, 2005. "The Effect of Shill Bidding upon Prices: Experimental Evidence," Experimental 0512002, EconWPA.
- Gustavo Rodriguez, 2012. "Sequential auctions with imperfect quantity commitment," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 49(1), pages 143-173, January.
- repec:hal:wpaper:halshs-00564888 is not listed on IDEAS
- Takahiro Watanabe & Takehiko Yamato, 2008. "A choice of auction format in seller cheating: a signaling game analysis," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 36(1), pages 57-80, July.
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