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exposita notes : More on phantom bidding

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Author Info
Ruqu Wang () (Department of Economics, Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario, K7L 3N6, CANADA)
Emin Murat Dinlersoz () (Department of Economics, University of Rochester, Rochester, NY 14627-0156, USA)
Parimal Kanti Bag () (Department of Economics, Birkbeck College, University of London, 7-15 Gresse St., London W1P 2LL, UK)

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Abstract

A phantom bidding model is analyzed for a sale auction. The following issues are addressed: the effects of phantom bidding on overall social welfare and buyers' profits. It is shown that social welfare may increase or decrease as the auctioneer switches from the fixed reserve price policy to phantom bidding. The buyers' profits will increase whenever social welfare increases.

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File URL: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00199/papers/0015003/00150701.pdf
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Publisher Info
Article provided by Springer in its journal Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 15 (2000)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
Pages: 701-707
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:15:y:2000:i:3:p:701-707

Note: Received: November 4, 1998; revised version: February 8, 1999
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Related research
Keywords: English auction; Phantom bidding; Fixed/flexible reserve price.;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions

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This page was last updated on 2009-7-2.

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