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Efficient Nash equilibria on semilattices

Author

Listed:
  • Walter Briec
  • Charles Horvath
  • QiBin Liang

Abstract

This contribution introduces the so-called quasi-Leontief functions. In the framework and the language of tropical algebras, our quasi-Leontief functions are the additive functions defined on a semimodule with values in the semiring of scalars. This class of functions encompasses as a special case the usual Leontief utility function. We establish the existence of efficient Nash equilibria when the strategy spaces are compact and pathconnected topological semilattices. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC. 2013

Suggested Citation

  • Walter Briec & Charles Horvath & QiBin Liang, 2013. "Efficient Nash equilibria on semilattices," Journal of Global Optimization, Springer, vol. 56(4), pages 1603-1615, August.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:jglopt:v:56:y:2013:i:4:p:1603-1615
    DOI: 10.1007/s10898-012-9915-2
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Vives, Xavier, 1990. "Nash equilibrium with strategic complementarities," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 305-321.
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