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Electoral control over policy-motivated candidates and their policy biases

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  • Kimiko Terai

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Suggested Citation

  • Kimiko Terai, 2009. "Electoral control over policy-motivated candidates and their policy biases," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 10(1), pages 43-64, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:10:y:2009:i:1:p:43-64
    DOI: 10.1007/s10101-008-0047-6
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Besley, Timothy & Smart, Michael, 2007. "Fiscal restraints and voter welfare," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(3-4), pages 755-773, April.
    2. Callander, Steven & Wilkie, Simon, 2007. "Lies, damned lies, and political campaigns," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 262-286, August.
    3. Alesina, Alberto & Spear, Stephen E., 1988. "An overlapping generations model of electoral competition," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(3), pages 359-379, December.
    4. Biglaiser, Gary & Mezzetti, Claudio, 1997. "Politicians' decision making with re-election concerns," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(3), pages 425-447, December.
    5. Humberto Llavador, 2006. "Electoral Platforms, Implemented Policies, and Abstention," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 27(1), pages 55-81, August.
    6. Cukierman, Alex & Tommasi, Mariano, 1998. "When Does It Take a Nixon to Go to China?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(1), pages 180-197, March.
    7. John Ferejohn, 1986. "Incumbent performance and electoral control," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 50(1), pages 5-25, January.
    8. Glazer, Amihai & Gradstein, Mark & Konrad, Kai A, 1998. "The Electoral Politics of Extreme Policies," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 108(451), pages 1677-1685, November.
    9. Robert Barro, 1973. "The control of politicians: An economic model," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 14(1), pages 19-42, March.
    10. Brandice Canes‐Wrone & Kenneth W. Shotts, 2004. "The Conditional Nature of Presidential Responsiveness to Public Opinion," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 48(4), pages 690-706, October.
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    Cited by:

    1. Yukihiro Nishimura & Kimiko Terai, 2016. "The Direction of Strategic Delegation and Voter Welfare in Asymmetric Tax Competition Models," Discussion Papers in Economics and Business 16-27, Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Electoral competition; Policy-motivated candidates; Re-election pressure; Policy bias; D72;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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