Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

Can Fiscal Decentralization Strengthen Social Capital?

Contents:

Author Info

  • Luiz R. De Mello Jr.

Abstract

Countries that are rich in social capital, defined as the social and political institutions that stimulate interpersonal trust, civic cooperation, and social cohesiveness, tend to have more efficient governments, have better governance systems, and grow faster. This article provides preliminary cross-country evidence for a sample of developing and developed countries that fiscal decentralization—the assignment of expenditure functions and revenue sources to lower levels of government—can boost social capital.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://pfr.sagepub.com/content/32/1/4.abstract
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Article provided by in its journal Public Finance Review.

Volume (Year): 32 (2004)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
Pages: 4-35

as in new window
Handle: RePEc:sae:pubfin:v:32:y:2004:i:1:p:4-35

Contact details of provider:

Related research

Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

References

No references listed on IDEAS
You can help add them by filling out this form.

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Busemeyer, Marius R., 2007. "The Impact of Fiscal Decentralisation on Education and Other Types of Spending," MPIfG Discussion Paper 07/8, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies.
  2. Bilin Neyapti & Zeynep Burcu Bulut-Cevik, 2011. "Fiscal Decentralization, Redistribution and Growth," Koç University-TUSIAD Economic Research Forum Working Papers 1114, Koc University-TUSIAD Economic Research Forum.
  3. Christoph A. Schaltegger & Benno Torgler, 2005. "Trust and Fiscal Performance: A Panel Analysis with Swiss Data," CREMA Working Paper Series 2005-05, Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA).
  4. Bilin Neyapti, 2008. "Fiscal Decentralization and Deficits : International Evidence," Departmental Working Papers 0802, Bilkent University, Department of Economics.
  5. Bilin Neyapti & Nida Cakir, 2007. "Does Fiscal Decentralization Promote Fiscal Discipline?," Departmental Working Papers 0708, Bilkent University, Department of Economics.
  6. Bilin Neyapti & Zafer Akin & Zeynep B. Cevik, 2011. "Does Fiscal Decentralization Promote Fiscal Discipline?," Departmental Working Papers 1101, Bilkent University, Department of Economics.
  7. de Mello, Luiz & Sab, Randa, 2002. "Government spending, rights, and civil liberties," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 22(3), pages 257-276, September.
  8. Iqbal, Nasir & Nawaz, Saima, 2010. "Fiscal Decentralization and Macroeconomic Stability: Theory and Evidence from Pakistan," MPRA Paper 27184, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  9. Faguet, Jean-Paul, 2014. "Decentralization and Governance," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 53(C), pages 2-13.
  10. Jørn Rattsø & Jon Hernes Fiva, 2005. "Decentralization with Property Taxation to Improve Incentives: Evidence from Local Governments’ Discrete Choice," Working Paper Series 5305, Department of Economics, Norwegian University of Science and Technology, revised 02 Sep 2005.
  11. Ronald MacDonald & Paul Hallwood, 2004. "The Economic Case for Fiscal Federalism in Scotland," Working papers 2004-42, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
  12. Schaltegger, Christoph & Torgler, Benno, 2006. "Government Accountability and Fiscal Discipline: A panel analysis using Swiss data," Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series qt1jc275p2, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics.
  13. Fabio Sabatini, 2007. "Mapping Italy’s social capital," QA - Rivista dell'Associazione Rossi-Doria, Associazione Rossi Doria, issue 1, March.
  14. Neyapti, Bilin, 2004. "Fiscal decentralization, central bank independence and inflation: a panel investigation," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 82(2), pages 227-230, February.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:sae:pubfin:v:32:y:2004:i:1:p:4-35. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (SAGE Publications).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.