Peer Effects in Team Sports: Empirical Evidence From NCAA Relay Teams
AbstractThis article investigates whether peer effects manifest in the performance of National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) 4 × 400 m men's relay teams. We test whether increasing the average quality of team members has a nonlinear and ultimately deleterious impact on team performance, measured by, relay time. Using both absolute and relative performance measures we find that increasing average team member quality improves team performance but at a decreasing rate. The authors attribute these diminishing returns to negative peer effects after finding that relay teams comprised of higher quality runners are more likely to underperform relative to their predicted quality.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by in its journal Journal of Sports Economics.
Volume (Year): 12 (2011)
Issue (Month): 1 (February)
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Other versions of this item:
- Craig A. Depken, II & Lisa E. Haglund, 2007. "Peer Effects in Team Sports: Empirical Evidence from NCAA Relay Teams," Working Papers 0729, International Association of Sports Economists & North American Association of Sports Economists.
- J31 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
- L20 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - General
- L83 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Sports; Gambling; Restaurants; Recreation; Tourism
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