The efficiency wage hypothesis has normally been used to generate an equilibrium level of unemployment. The authors use it, instead, to generate an equilibrium wage distribution. This paper starts by generalizing the previous work of R. M. Solow in this area. They then use their results on effort-wage elasticities to derive a model of wage dispersion. The wage rate is shown to be an increasing function of the damage potential of workers; that is, workers with the highest damage potential receive the highest wage. The analysis of the equilibrium of the wage distribution provides interesting qualitative insights into the nature of actual wage differentials. Copyright 1991 by The London School of Economics and Political Science.
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Article provided by London School of Economics and Political Science in its journal Economica.
Volume (Year): 58 (1991) Issue (Month): 232 (November) Pages: 501-14 Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML
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