Elisabetta Iossa () (Università di Roma 'Tor Vergata', Brunel University, CEDI e CMPO) Federico Antellini Russo () (CONSIP, Roma e LUISS Guido Carli)
Abstract
In this paper we discuss procedural and contractual aspects of Public Private Partnerships (PPP) in Italy, in the light of the economic theory of contracts and of incentives. We emphasize the potential role for PPPs for infrastructure development in Italy and the inefficiencies that arise in practice because of administrative risk, procedural complexity that distort competition and inefficient allocation of risks between the public and the private sector.
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Volume (Year): 98 (2008) Issue (Month): 3 (May-June) Pages: 125-158 Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML
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Find related papers by JEL classification: D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty L5 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy H54 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Infrastructures H57 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Procurement
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