Advanced Search

Papers Articles Authors Institutions Data (FRED®)

Abstract

Vertical integration followed by quantity competition is studied. In the first stage of the game downstream firms simultaneously decide whether to integrate with one of the upstream suppliers. If firms are not able to observe whether their vertically integrated competitor enters the intermediate-good market then they are indifferent about vertical integration. If the entry choice of the integrated firm is observable then the unique equilibrium involves vertical integration and in-house production of the intermediate good. The importance of entry observability sheds light on the strategic importance of information exchange institutions such as the internet and business fairs.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.rivistapoliticaeconomica.it/2007/set-ot/vergara_caffarelli.php
Download Restriction: Payment required

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Bibliographic Info

Article provided by SIPI Spa in its journal Rivista di Politica Economica.

Volume (Year): 97 (2007)
Issue (Month): 5 (September-October)
Pages: 203-244

as HTML HTML with abstract plain text plain text with abstract BibTeX RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite) ReDIF in new window

Handle: RePEc:rpo:ripoec:v:97:y:2007:i:5:p:203-244

Contact details of provider:

Related research

Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

• L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
• L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as HTML HTML with abstract plain text plain text with abstract BibTeX RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite) ReDIF in new window

1. Henrick Horn & Asher Wolinsky, 1988. "Bilateral Monopolies and Incentives for Merger," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 19(3), pages 408-419, Autumn.
   
   • Horn, H. & Wolinsky, A., 1988. "Bilateral Monopolies And Incentives For Merger," Papers 410, Stockholm - International Economic Studies.
2. Acemoglu, Daron & Aghion, Philippe & Griffith, Rachel & Zilibotti, Fabrizio, 2005. "Vertical Integration and Technology: Theory and Evidence," CEPR Discussion Papers 5258, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
   
   • Daron Acemoglu & Philippe Aghion & Rachel Griffith & Fabrizio Zilibotti, 2010. "Vertical Integration and Technology: Theory and Evidence," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 8(5), pages 989-1033, 09.
   • Daron Acemoglu & Philippe Aghion & Rachel Griffith & Fabrizio Zilibotti, 2004. "Vertical integration and technology: theory and evidence," IFS Working Papers W04/34, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
   • Daron Acemoglu & Philippe Aghion & Rachel Griffith & Fabrizio Zilibotti, 2004. "Vertical Integration and Technology: Theory and Evidence," NBER Working Papers 10997, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
   • Zilibotti, Fabrizio & Griffith, Rachel & Aghion, Philippe & Acemoglu, Daron, 2010. "Vertical Integration and Technology: Theory and Evidence," Scholarly Articles 4554219, Harvard University Department of Economics.
   • Daron Acemoglu & Philippe Aghion & Rachel Griffith & Fabrizio Zilibotti, 2007. "Vertical Integration and Technology: Theory and Evidence," IEW - Working Papers 342, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
3. Oliver Hart & Sanford Grossman, 1985. "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration," Working papers 372, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
   
   • Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver D, 1986. "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(4), pages 691-719, August.
   • Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver, 1985. "The Cost and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration," CEPR Discussion Papers 70, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
   • Grossman, Sanford J. & Hart, Oliver D., 1986. "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration," Scholarly Articles 3450060, Harvard University Department of Economics.
4. Sibley, David S. & Weisman, Dennis L., 1998. "Raising rivals' costs: The entry of an upstream monopolist into downstream markets," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 10(4), pages 451-470, December.
5. Paul Krugman, 1990. "Increasing Returns and Economic Geography," NBER Working Papers 3275, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
   
   • Krugman, Paul, 1991. "Increasing Returns and Economic Geography," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 99(3), pages 483-99, June.
6. repec:cup:cbooks:9780521016919 is not listed on IDEAS
7. Bagella Michele & Becchetti Leonardo, 1999. "Effetto distretto e performance delle esportazioni sotto diversi regimi di cambio: analisi empirica e implicazioni per l'Euro," Politica economica, Società editrice il Mulino, issue 2, pages 225-252.
8. Francesco Brioschi & Maria Sole Brioschi & Giulio Cainelli, 2002. "From the industrial district to the district group: An insight into the evolution of capitalism in italy1," Regional Studies, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 36(9), pages 1037-1052.
9. Maness, Robert, 1996. "Incomplete contracts and the choice between vertical integration and franchising," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 101-115, October.
10. Dobson, Paul W & Waterson, Michael, 1997. "Countervailing Power and Consumer Prices," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 107(441), pages 418-30, March.
11. Soubeyran, A. & Thisse, J.-F., 1998. "Learning-by-Doing and the Development of Industrial Districts," G.R.E.Q.A.M. 98a26, Universite Aix-Marseille III.
    
    • Soubeyran, Antoine & Thisse, Jacques-Francois, 1999. "Learning-by-Doing and the Development of Industrial Districts," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 156-176, January.
12. Inês CABRAL, 2002. "A Herding Approach to Merger Waves," Economics Working Papers ECO2002/26, European University Institute.
13. Gianmarco I.P. Ottaviano, 2000. "Ad usum delphini: A Primer in "New Economy Geography"," Giornale degli Economisti, GDE (Giornale degli Economisti e Annali di Economia), Bocconi University, vol. 59(1), pages 89-116, April.
    
    • Ottaviano, G.I.P., 1999. "Ad Usum Delphini: a Primer in 'New Economic Geography'," Economics Working Papers eco99/28, European University Institute.
14. Nirvikar Singh & Xavier Vives, 1984. "Price and Quantity Competition in a Differentiated Duopoly," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 15(4), pages 546-554, Winter.
15. Lieberman, Marvin B, 1991. "Determinants of Vertical Integration: An Empirical Test," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 39(5), pages 451-66, September.
16. Joseph J. Spengler, 1950. "Vertical Integration and Antitrust Policy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 58, pages 347.
17. Volker Nocke & Lucy White, 2003. "Do Vertical Mergers Facilitate Upstream Collusion? Second Version," PIER Working Paper Archive 05-013, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 08 Mar 2005.
18. Gene M. Grossman & Elhanan Helpman, 2002. "Integration Versus Outsourcing In Industry Equilibrium," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 117(1), pages 85-120, February.
19. Salinger, Michael A, 1988. "Vertical Mergers and Market Foreclosure," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 103(2), pages 345-56, May.
20. David M. Kreps & Jose A. Scheinkman, 1983. "Quantity Precommitment and Bertrand Competition Yield Cournot Outcomes," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 14(2), pages 326-337, Autumn.

Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:rpo:ripoec:v:97:y:2007:i:5:p:203-244

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Adriana Leo).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

---

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.

Privacy Legal