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La concurrence entre gouvernements est-elle bénéfique?

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  • Marceau, Nicolas

    (UQÀM, CIRPÉE et IZA)

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    Abstract

    In this paper, we attempt to answer two questions: (1) Is competition between governments advantageous? (2) If the answer to this question is no, what can be done to solve some of the problems generated by this competition? Résumé : Dans cet article, nous tentons de répondre à deux questions : (1) La concurrence entre gouvernements est-elle bénéfique? (2) Si la réponse à cette question est non, peut-on corriger les problèmes qui découlent de cette concurrence?

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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Société Canadienne de Science Economique in its journal L'Actualité Economique.

    Volume (Year): 84 (2008)
    Issue (Month): 4 (Décembre)
    Pages: 365-390

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    Handle: RePEc:ris:actuec:0007

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