Centralized versus decentralized taxation of mobile polluting firms
AbstractWe consider a world in which a mobile polluting firm must locate in one of two regions. The regions differ in two dimensions: their marginal cost of pollution and the production cost of the firm. It is shown that under incomplete information on regional marginal costs of pollution, fiscal competition may lead to the sub-optimal location of the firm. We also show that under incomplete information, a sub-optimal location is less likely under centralized than under decentralized taxation. Nous Ã©tudions un monde dans lequel une firme polluante mobile cherche Ã se localiser dans une de deux rÃ©gions donnÃ©es. Les rÃ©gions prÃ©sentent des diffÃ©rences quant Ã leur coÃ»t marginal des Ã©missions polluantes et quant Ã leur coÃ»t de production. Il est dÃ©montrÃ© que dans un contexte d'information incomplÃ¨te sur les coÃ»ts marginaux de pollution des rÃ©gions, la concurrence fiscale peut mener Ã une localisation non-optimale de la firme. Il est Ã©galement dÃ©montrÃ© que la centralisation de la taxation rÃ©duit la probabilitÃ© d'une localisation non-optimale.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Resource and Energy Economics.
Volume (Year): 23 (2001)
Issue (Month): 4 (October)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505569
Other versions of this item:
- Georges A. Tanguay & Nicolas Marceau, 2000. "Centralized versus Decentralized Taxation of Mobile Polluting Firms," Cahiers de recherche CREFE / CREFE Working Papers 122, CREFE, Université du Québec à Montréal.
- R38 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Real Estate Markets, Production Analysis, and Firm Location - - - Government Policy; Regulatory Policy
- H73 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Interjurisdictional Differentials and Their Effects
- Q28 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Government Policy
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